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ABSTRACT

INCLUSION TOWARD TRANSFORMATION:
PSYCHOSOCIAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY AND GLOBAL MENTAL HEALTH

August 2021

Justin M. Karter, B.A. State University of New York Buffalo
M.A., Point Park University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Lisa Cosgrove

The Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH) has been met with criticism for
reifying Western conceptions of mental disorders and diverting resources from the
investigation, intervention, and education regarding the social determinants of mental health.
Advocates identifying as a person with a psychosocial disability are organizing to transform
the MGMH from a top-down, individualized, and universal approach toward a rights-based
conception that accounts for the cultural, political, and economic conditions that produce
distress and disability. Using a qualitative, hermeneutic, interpretative-phenomenological
analysis (IPA), this research study focused on how people with a lived experience of mental
distress and treatment come to question the mainstream discourses of the psy-disciplines,
identify as people with psychosocial disabilities, and engage in advocacy both within and
against the MGMH. The results contribute to debates on how to conceptualize
madness/distress, reveal the emergence of the psychosocial disability identity as a major
IV

force in mental health advocacy. and point to the transformative potential of an integrated
psychosocial disability framework for a more rights-based approach. Recommendations are
made for mental health researchers, practitioners, and activists to promote and enhance the
inclusion of people with lived experience.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH) has been met with criticism from
cross-cultural and critical psychiatrists and psychologists, as well as psychiatric survivors,
service-users/consumers, and people with psychosocial disabilities, for reifying Western
conceptions of mental disorders and diverting resources from investigation, intervention and
education regarding the social determinants of mental health (Mills, 2014; Beresford, 2018).
The writing and activism of people with lived experience of mental distress and treatment
within the low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) of the Global South, targeted for the
scale-up efforts of the MGMH, present a counter-discourse to that characterized by the psycomplex (Rose, 2018). Activists who identify as persons/people with psychosocial
disabilities and use this term to engage in advocacy efforts, herein referred to as psychosocial
disability advocates, are organizing to transform the MGMH from a top-down,
individualized, and universal approach, toward a rights-based conception that accounts for
the cultural, political, and economic conditions that produce distress and disability (Davar,
2008).
Using a qualitative, hermeneutic, interpretative-phenomenological analysis (IPA), this
research study focuses on how people with a lived experience of mental distress and
treatment have come to question the mainstream discourses of the psy-disciplines, identify as
people with psychosocial disabilities, and engage in activism with the MGMH.
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The results provide novel insights into how the psychosocial disability framework, as
it is lived by those who have adopted it, contributes to debates on how to conceptualize
madness/distress. The lived experiences of people with psychosocial disabilities, as described
in these results, also shed light on how psychosocial disability has emerged as an umbrella
term for mental health advocates with lived experience, altering the landscape of mental
health advocacy. In addition, the perspectives of the participants in this study on their
engagement with the MGMH speak to how global mental health research and policies would
be fundamentally transformed toward a rights-based approach by a thorough integration of
the psychosocial disability framework.
The results of this study can also be used to develop strategies for mental health
researchers, practitioners, and activists to promote the inclusion of people with lived
experience. Additionally, the results may be useful in developing policy recommendations
for moving the MGMH toward a rights-based approach.
Conceptual Framework: Discourse, Subjectivity, and Madness
A variety of terms have been used to denote what is often referred to in the mental
health field as mental disorders, each with their own historical resonances, conceptual
baggage, and groups of supporters and detractors (Pilgrim, 2007). Currently, the most
common referents for mental distress are the various diagnoses outlined in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM-5) and the similar International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-11). These categories, however, are controversial and often
eschewed by those aiming to denaturalize the assumptions that often come with these terms
(Karter & Kamens, 2019). The term “madness,” while potentially viewed as anti-scientific or
stigmatizing, is often favored by those who resist a reductive medical approach and may refer
2

to themselves as “psychiatric survivors,” “consumers,” “service-users,” or those with
“psychosocial disabilities” (Adame, 2014; Dhar, 2019). While terms such as “mental illness,”
“mental disorder,” and “brain disorder” appear more commonly as the object of investigation
in the psy-disciplines, “madness” is a term with deeper historical roots that refers to a broader
conception of experiences of distress and unreason than that captured through a medical lens.
Following Scull (2015):
Madness has much broader salience for the social order and the cultures we form part of,
and has resonance in the world of literature and art and of religious belief, as well as in
the scientific domain. And it implies stigma, and stigma has been and continues to be, a
lamentable aspect of what it means to be mad. . . The social and the cultural dimensions
of mental disorders, so indispensable a part of the story of madness in civilisation over
the centuries, are unlikely to melt away, or prove to be nothing more than
epiphenomenal features of so universal a feature of human existence. Madness indeed
has its meanings, elusive and evanescent as our attempts to capture them have been. It
remains a fundamental puzzle, a reproach to reason, inescapably part and parcel of
civilisation itself. (p. 14)
Indeed, the term is also resonant with the work of Michel Foucault in Madness and
Civilization (1967), which sets the conceptual framework for this analysis. Foucault
challenges the notion that madness is primarily a property of individual consciousness; he
demonstrates this through his archaeological method, which excavates radically different
ways of thinking and speaking about madness, referred to as discursive formations, over
place and time. In doing so, he reveals a nuanced interplay between individual psyches and
social formations, subjectivity, and discourse. Foucault’s archaeological method exposes the
historical and cultural contingency of conceptions of madness, as different discursive
formations have taken precedent at different times with marked changes occurring through
epistemic shifts. In later work such as Discipline and Punish (1977/1975), Foucault
employed a genealogical method to further add to this analysis, elaborating the ways in
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which power over knowledge production is connected to epistemic shifts and differing
discursive formations.
Investigations of madness, following Foucault, have observed the rise of the modern
mental health fields and the power they wield over current discursive formations. The term
“psy-disciplines” (Rose, 1998) has been used to denote all of the disciplines (psychology,
psychiatry, psychotherapy) that attempt to conceptualize, describe, and intervene upon the
human mind generally, and disorders of the mind, or “madness,” in particular. From a
discourse-analytic and Foucauldian perspective, the power of the psy-disciplines to affect
global mental health policy goes beyond involvement in the medico-legal details–important
as these are–and includes the power to produce forms of subjectivity (Parker, 1997).
Subjectivity, as used here, refers to the modes of life or the possibilities for lived experience
that are available within a particular historical and social context (Heyes, 2010). The “psycomplex,” which Rose (1985, 1989) uses to denote the “complex discourses, practices,
agents, and techniques” of the psy-disciplines (Rose, 1985, p. 9), thus refers to the multiply
interconnected but distinct ways in which the theories and practices of the modern psydisciples affect contemporary subjectivity: constructing categories into which subjects and
societies are placed, practices for observing, measuring, and tracking subjects so categorized,
and the living out of particular ways of being produced by these constructs (Parker, 1997, p.
4).
Recognizing the “psy-complex” involves coming to grips with the power of the field not
only to define and categorize human experience but also, in some ways, to create it; to “make
up” people (Hacking, 1986). Following the sociologist Nikolas Rose (2003), the question that
confronts the psy-disciplines is “the question of ethics as Lebensführung: what kind of
4

creatures do we think we should become?” Indeed, there exists a rich and varied literature
representing dissenting voices within the psy-disciplines and the social and human sciences
more broadly, as well as those subject to the theories and practices of the field, that critiques
the prominent discursive constructions of their time and points to their harms and limitations
(Adame & Knudson, 2007; Bracken & Thomas, 2010; Cohen, 2016) along with the
boundaries and obstacles that limit the diversity of voices included in the broader discourse
(Jones & Brown, 2012). Thus, the ethical question confronting the psy-disciplines is not just
one of discourse (how to speak of madness), but one of politics and participation (whose
accounts “matter”). In this way, contemporary critical engagement with the psy-complex
seeks to go beyond Foucault’s work to incorporate an analysis of power with greater
attunement to the histories and ongoing legacies of racism and colonialism (Weheliye, 2014).
Efforts to disrupt the epistemic power of the psy-disciplines through diversifying
inclusion and participation are undertaken in different forms within different spheres of
praxis, ranging from individual interactions to research methods to local and international
policy, among others. For example, in individual clinical interactions, critical psychiatrists
have called for a privileging of accounts and descriptions by service users and patients of
their distress to avoid imposing the diagnostic and explanatory models produced by the field
(Bracken, 2014). In the research context, qualitative methods such as phenomenology and
hermeneutics prioritize the lived experiences of participants, rather than attempting to fit
their experiences into pre-determined constructs as in positivist research. In this way,
qualitative research allows participants’ first-hand descriptions of mental distress, formulated
in their own terms, to enter the body of knowledge attached to the psy-disciplines. At a
structural level, people with lived experience, critical researchers and practitioners work to
5

remove barriers to full equality and participation in society by way of community
engagement, connectedness, and integration (Bromage et al., 2019). For example, in the
effort toward deinstitutionalization, the movement for democratic psychiatry (McLaughlin,
2003) found it necessary to challenge medical and legal practices preventing full citizenship
at the same time that it worked to challenge cultural stereotypes about madness (ScheperHughes & Lovell, 1986). Recent work in critical disability studies extends this tradition,
arguing that social and structural change is necessary for inclusion and that full inclusion
necessitates a transformation of normative standards (Dirth & Adams, 2019). Toward this
end, organizations such as the National User Survivor Network (NSUN) campaign for full
legal equality for people labeled mad, and call for protection from coercive practices within
the psy-disciplines such as forced treatment, as well as from discriminatory practices in
employment and other social institutions (Sayce, 2017). Additionally, organizations run by
people with psychosocial disabilities have emerged, primarily in the Global South, aiming for
the full and effective inclusion of people with lived experience in research and policy efforts
as well as society at large. For example, the Bali declaration by TCI Asia-Pacific, the Cape
Town declaration by the Pan-African Network of Persons with Psychosocial Disabilities, and
the Lima declaration by the Redesfera Latinoamericana de la Diversidad Psicosocial all
contest the continued efforts of the psy-disciplines to exclude the voices of people who are
the “objects” of theorizing and treatments (TCI Asia-Pacific, 2018; PANUSP, 2011;
Redesfera, 2018).
These efforts toward epistemological and ontological diversity remain largely marginal
to the hegemonic theories and practices of the psy-disciplines, however (Hoffman, 2016).
Such continued marginalization is perhaps most evident in the Movement for Global Mental
6

Health (MGMH) (Davar, 2016; Fernando, 2017; Klein & Mills, 2017), which aims to
uncritically scale up the dominant concepts and practices of the psy-disciplines
internationally. Especially in light of this development, an approach to global mental health
is needed that would be capable of appreciating the cross-cultural variation in mental and
emotional life as well as the socio-political influences on madness and well-being. In this
sense, the psychiatric survivor, service-user, and psychosocial disability rights movements
may constitute unique “counter discourses” to those promoted by the MGMH, albeit with
less institutionalized power (Foucault, 1980).
Purpose of Study
This study aims to investigate such a counter or alternative discourse through the
experiences of individuals who experienced madness/mental distress, been subjected to the
discourses and practices of the psy-disciplines, identify as people with psychosocial
disabilities, and are currently engaged in various forms of activism related to the MGMH.
There is a gap in the current literature when it comes to the experiences of psychosocial
disability advocates in the context of the MGMH. This study will add to the existing
literature by specifically addressing how people with psychosocial disabilities navigate their
identity and mental health activism while confronting and seeking to reform the MGMH.
Using a qualitative, hermeneutic, interpretative-phenomenological approach (IPA), this
research will focus on how people with a lived experience of mental distress and treatment
came to identify as a person with a psychosocial disability and engage in advocacy around
the MGMH. The results of this study can be used to develop strategies for mental health
researchers, practitioners, and activists for a more systematic inclusion of people with lived
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experience. Additionally, the results may be useful in developing policy recommendations
for moving the MGMH toward a rights-based approach.
Research Questions
The study was driven by the following research questions:
1) How did the participants’ lived experience of mental distress and treatment shape
their identity as people with psychosocial disabilities engaged in advocacy?
2) How does the psychosocial disability framework shift how advocates make meaning
of their activism in the context of the Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH)?
3) What are the advantages of using a psychosocial disability framework when engaging
in advocacy related to the Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH) and what
barriers do these advocates face?

8

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The field of mental health research and practice faces sustained critique on many
fronts. Critics of the psy-disciplines from within psychiatry, psychology, and the social
sciences, as well as those with personal experience with mental health treatment, have taken
the field to task for a myriad of issues, including: the corruption of research, practice
guidelines, and treatment (Cosgrove et al., 2018); the undue influence of the pharmaceutical
industry (Whitaker & Cosgrove, 2015); the lack of validity of prominent diagnostic
constructs (Phillips et al., 2012; Karter & Kamens, 2019); over-diagnosis, over-treatment
with psychopharmceuticals, and medicalization (Moncreiff & Crawford, 2001; Frances,
2010); the pathologization and disempowerment of those engaging with mental health
services (Hornstein, 2017); and complicity with (and reproduction of) oppressive and
marginalizing social systems and ideologies (Parker, 2009; Metzl, 2010; Cosgrove & Karter,
2018), including colonialism, among others.
Cutting across each of these debates are issues surrounding the cross-cultural relevance
and application of the Western psy-disciplines and its attendant discourses, technologies, and
products. Broadly, these can be divided into two discussions: those seeking to improve
access to the standard mental health treatments available in the Global North for those in
marginalized or underserved populations, both domestically and internationally, and those
investigating the social determinants and “global burden of obstacles” to mental health and
well-being (Pūras, 2017), including the misapplication of the psy-disciplines as a potential
9

obstacle (Whitley, 2015). The following brief history of some major debates in cross-cultural
and transcultural psychiatry aims to place the current disagreements over global mental
health in sufficient context. Meanwhile, an analysis of these arguments over time illuminates
the political and ideological stakes at play, opening a space for reflecting on contemporary
debates over culture and madness.
Finding Ourselves: Madness and Culture
Arguments about the role of culture in psychiatry are as old as the discipline itself
(Jilek, 1995). When psychiatrists in the colonial period began to set up mental asylums and
study mental disorders among the indigenous populations of India and the Americas, they
initially concluded that these populations suffered from few such issues (Chakraborty, 1991).
One simple line of thinking used to explain this observation was that mental disorders likely
arose as a product of Western civilization; that the demands of high culture produced mental
stress and the working conditions of the poor in urban settings eroded health (Raimundo Oda
et al., 2005). According to this line of thought, natives, seen as “healthy primitives,” were not
“mad” because they did not suffer the deleterious effects of civilization (Kirmayer, 2007).
However, when accounts of what was termed “native madness” began to be reported by
psychiatrists working in colonial hospitals, these narratives challenged earlier assumptions
about the role of culture in mental disorder in a way that threatened to undermine larger
political narratives about the beneficent and civilizing effects of colonialism. If natives were
capable of madness, this could mean that they were just as “intellectually advanced” as their
colonizers. Alternatively, psychiatrists of the time may have asked themselves whether these
newfound cases of madness were somehow a result of something new in the lives of the
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native populations, perhaps even the presence of the colonizers themselves (Littlewood &
Bhugra, 2001).
By the mid-19th century, a solution to this ideological cognitive dissonance arose. A new
British-German biological approach to madness and mental disorders posited that psychiatric
problems were universal conditions arising from pathological biological processes internal to
the person, and only mediated in their expression by culture and language, thus producing
“culture bound syndromes” (Yap, 1974). This biomedical approach is often traced to the
work of Emil Kraepelin, considered the father of modern psychiatry. In 1904, Kraepelin
studied “major psychoses” in Southeast Asia and Indonesia, concluding that these disorders
were universal and that any differences in phenomenology may be explained by differences
in intellectual development. The comparatively low rates of delusions among the Javanese
were hypothesized as “related to the lower stage of intellectual development attained…” or
“might reflect the fact that speech counts for far less than it does with us and that thoughts
tend to be governed more by sensory images” (Kraepelin, 1904, as cited in Kirmayer, 2018).
In 1923, the German-American psychiatrist Karl Birnbaum famously made the distinction
between pathogenesis and pathoplasticity in psychiatry, with pathogenic factors referring to
the underlying biological structure of the mental disorder and pathoplastic factors referring to
how these universal structures may be translated differently by culture (Birnbaum, 1923 as
cited in Murphy, 2011).
Although this approach is often understood as a scientific advance in traditional histories
of the field, it is also evident that shifting to a biological explanation of mental disorders may
have obscured the relationship between colonialism and the madness of native populations.
For instance, within Birnbaum’s conceptualization, the question might have been asked, "Did
11

colonization do anything more than re-label local deviances; can we say that in itself it was
pathogenic in any empirical sense?" (Littlewood & Bhugra, 2001, p. 14). Historical work on
the accounts of British and French psychiatrists in this period support this point, as their
writings present “accounts of dysfunction that they localized in ‘the indigenous mind,’ and
almost never in a culture of political and racial oppression” (Keller, 2001, p. 297).
The writings of Kraepelin and colonial psychiatrists echo throughout current debates
over the cross-cultural applicability of psychiatric diagnostic constructs. The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which was explicitly developed based upon
the universalist ideas of Kraepelin (Compton & Guze, 1995), has historically used the
concept of “culture-bound syndromes” to assist practitioners in recognizing divergences from
“standard,” i.e. Western, patients. Similarly, the etic-emic distinction in philosophy of
science marks a divide between traits that apply to all humans–for example, the necessity of
eating and drinking, referred to as “etic” (from phonetic, meaning language general)–and
traits that are unique to a particular context, referred to as “emic” (from phonemic, meaning
language-specific), like certain religious practices (Pedersen, 1999). In the most recent
edition of the manual, DSM-5, the concept of “culture-bound syndromes” was replaced with
“cultural syndromes,” “cultural idioms of distress,” and “cultural explanation/perceived
distress” (APA, 2013). While this new formulation broadens the understanding of culture to
include descriptions of experiences made available by particular cultural contexts and not just
mediated by them, it fails to recognize that the most common DSM diagnoses may
themselves be products of the particular cultural and material conditions of the contemporary
Western societies in which they were developed (Phillips, 2013; Ecks, 2016; Bartholomew,
2000).
12

There has been a steady resistance to these neo-Kraepelinian theories characteristic of
Western psychiatrists and psychologists, from researchers and activists pushing for a
recognition of the role that colonial contexts and oppressive practices play in the creation of
mental and emotional distress (Littlewood, 1990). In Peau noire, masques blancs (Black
skin, white masks; 1952), Fanon dismissed the assumptions of Western psychiatry as racist,
arguing that colonialism was responsible for producing a form of psychopathology and that
oppressive practices become inscribed psychologically on the colonized.
Beginning in the 1960s, the antipsychiatry movement in the United States, led in
large part by former patients identifying as psychiatric survivors, joined forces with anti-war
and antiauthoritarian movements to challenge the use of psychological constructs for social
control (Boyers, 1974). In 1977, Arthur Kleinman introduced an approach termed the “new
cross-cultural psychiatry,” which challenged the universality of mental disorders and made
use of anthropological and ethnographic methods to study the meaning of particular forms of
distress within their social, historical, and cultural contexts (Kleinman, 1977, 1986, 1997).
Within the “third phase in the history of cultural psychiatry” (Kirmayer, 2007), where the
mental health fields are approached anthropologically, critical psychiatrists point to the role
of the pharmaceutical industry in the production of mental health constructs and treatments
(Moncrieff et al., 2005; Whitaker & Cosgrove, 2015; Steingard, 2019). At the same time,
critical psychologists have attended to role of psychological concepts within larger social and
political systems (Parker, 2015; Hook et al., 2004; Teo, 2014; Cohen, 2017). Despite the
prominence of Kleinman’s approach, and the resultant body of knowledge on culturally
located forms of distress, mainstream psychology and psychiatry has largely ignored the
investigation of how mental health practices and institutions themselves contribute to the
13

emergence of certain experiences of mental and emotional suffering (see e.g., Rose & AbiRached, 2013; Watters, 2010).
This brief overview has aimed to illustrate two major points: (1) different approaches to
understanding madness and mental disorder throughout time have reflected the ideological
and political interests of those in the West; and (2) there remains substantial cause for
concern when Western mental health diagnoses and treatments are used in non-Western
populations. Unfortunately, mainstream psychiatry and the psy-disciplines have failed to
heed the concerns raised throughout this history, instead continuing to approach madness
from a decontextualized point of view that not only privileges Western frameworks, but also
reifies and centers these concepts as the universal standard against which all others are
measured. Indeed, at a time when substantial challenges have been posed to the underlying
assumptions of the field as well as its predominant treatment strategies, and while
globalization and mass migration makes it clear that no heterogeneous population exists in
which these categories can be reliably applied, mainstream psychiatry is doubling down on
efforts to ply its trade the world over without serious engagement with questions of culture
and power (Fernando, 2012; Summerfield, 2013).
Doubling Down and Scaling Up: The Movement for Global Mental Health
Most recently, these debates have centered on the Movement for Global Mental Health
(MGMH), launched in 2007 by a group of experts known as the Lancet Group for Global
Mental Health (Patel et al., 2007; 2011, Chisholm et al., 2016). Advocates of the MGMH call
to “scale up the coverage of services for mental disorders in all countries, but especially in
low-income and middle-income countries” (Chisholm et al., 2007, p. 1241) and to “close the
treatment gap” between those who need treatment and the small number who receive it
14

(Chisholm et al., 2011, p. 1242). The World Health Organization (WHO) issued the Mental
Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP) guidelines in 2010, framing mental health as a
priority for global development (World Health Organization, 2010).
Further, in 2015, mental health was included in the United Nations (UN) sustainable
development goals (SDGs) with the intention of incentivizing programs that address mental
health care within international development plans (United Nations, 2015). Additionally, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have advocated for addressing
mental disorders globally as a means of increasing economic productivity (Mnookin, 2016).
The Lancet Psychiatry formed a Commission on Global Mental Health in 2016, with the goal
of developing research and intervention implementation plans for the MGMH (Patel et al.,
2016). On October 10, 2018, World Mental Health Day, the Lancet Commission published a
report outlining a framework and proposal for “scaling up” mental health care globally (Patel
et al., 2018). In concert with this release, the UK government hosted a Global Mental Health
Ministerial Summit with the intention of laying out a course of action to implement mental
health policies globally.
The MGMH contains a diversity of viewpoints on culture and mental health, with some
acknowledgment of the need to adapt methods and interventions to specific contexts. The
thrust of this movement, however, assumes that the current conceptual, diagnostic, and
treatment approaches of psychiatry can be applied without engaging ethnographic and
anthropological work and without critical reflexive analysis of the evidence-base of the
Western mental health field (Beresford, 2018; Kirmayer & Pedersen, 2014). Across the
reports and publications produced by different players in the MGMH, including academic
groups and large international development organizations, the framing of mental distress
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ranges from categories such from “mental health problems,” “mental illness” and “mental
disorders” (De Silva & Roland, 2014), to “behavioral, developmental and neurological
disorders” (United Nations, 2015). As Mills (2018) argues, these reports locate distress
primarily within the brain and presents mental disorders as “highly prevalent, accounting for
a large burden of disease” (p. 849).
Claims concerning the prevalence and burdensomeness of mental distress have their
roots in epidemiological data attempting to utilize the measures and metrics of physical
illnesses for the calculation of statistics related to mental disorders (Bemme & D’souza,
2014). Starting in 1991, the World Bank and the WHO initiated the Global Burden of
Disease studies (GBDs) in an attempt to quantify the role of medical interventions in
economic development and to assess progress toward them (Murray & Lopez, 1996). One of
the indicators utilized by the GBDs to compare different disease categories is the Disabilityadjusted Life Year (DALY) metric, which calculates how many years of life are lost to a
disease category due to early death or loss of functional abilities from disability. The 2010
GBD study included “mental, neurological, and substance use disorders,” and a key finding
was the rapid increase in non-communicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), with the proportion of the burden attributable to these diseases rising from 36% in
1990 to 49% in 2010 (Murray et al., 2012; Charlson et al., 2014). As alluded to earlier, these
statistics assume (and reproduce the assumption) that categories of mental distress, such as
depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, etc., apply universally across different cultures and
locales.
Similarly, in a study for the World Economic Forum, Bloom et al. (2011) attempted to
calculate the economic cost of mental disorders, finding that the global cost of these
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disorders would reach US$6 trillion by the year 2030 accounting for a large percentage of all
lost output and productivity worldwide. Going further, a 2016 study estimated that without
the implementation of treatments worldwide, depression and anxiety disorders would cost the
36 largest companies in the world US$925 billion every year (Chisholm et al., 2016, p. 419).
This suggestion of course assumes that it is possible to increase life expectancies through
“health interventions alone, rather than non-health sector (developmental) interventions”
(Das & Rao, 2012, p. 384; see also Anand & Hanson, 2004).
The most recent reports released by the WHO (2017) suggest that anxiety and
depression impact 260 million and 322 million people around the globe, respectively, with
3.6% of the global population living with an anxiety disorder and 4.4% living with
depression. While the prevalence of common mental disorders appears to be increasing most
rapidly in the LMICs of the Global South, with almost “half the number of people living with
depression residing in South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions,” the report suggests that
the increase in anxiety disorders was particularly high in the Americas, with the prevalence
increasing by 18.4% between 2005 and 2015 (Friedrich, 2017, p. 1517).
There are a number of assumptions made in these calculations, some of which will be
addressed below, but the foundational issue remains whether or not mental distress across the
globe can be adequately captured by Western diagnostic constructs (Brhlikova et al., 2011).
The MGMH makes a case for the urgent implementation of standard mental health
interventions based on these dire statistics; yet such measurements rest on the problematic
assertion, one that has been called into question throughout the history of cross-cultural
psychiatry, that culturally specific and complex experiences of distress can be reduced to
illness definitions which are alien in many contexts (Fernando, 2014; Summerfield, 2008).
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The assumption that LMICs in the Global South do not have culturally specific ways of
responding to mental distress–with the implication that quantitative metrics like the ones
above are to be taken literally–contributes to this sense of urgency in the MGMH, leading to
the development of simplified and resource-poor interventions that are increasingly technical
rather than holistic (Bemme & Kirmayer, 2020).
Counter-Narratives Against Global Mental Health
Although the MGMH has continued to pick up steam, gaining funding and the support of
international organizations (Rose, 2006; 2018), it has also been met with considerable
resistance from critical scholars and mental health activists with lived experience (Beresford,
2018; TCI Asia-Pacific, 2018; PANUSP, 2011; Redesfera, 2018). Previous research suggests
that the MGMH primarily reproduces a discourse that reifies Western conceptions of mental
distress (Mills, 2014).
In 2012, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) announced an initiative, “Grand
Challenges to Global Mental Health” (Collins et al., 2011). The initiative was outlined in an
article in Nature accompanied by an image of an African child chained to a tree, ostensibly to
demonstrate the human rights abuses that might occur in the Global South if mental health
treatments, developed in the Global North, were not implemented there (Mills, 2014). Critics
and service-user activists responded with a letter making six key critiques (Shukla et al.,
2012). A discussion of each of these six points (as summarized by Mills, 2014, p. 4-5) is
useful for presenting the major arguments that have been made against the MGMH.
Lack of Collaboration with Local Communities and Survivors/Service-Users
Survivors and users of psychiatry and mental health care more generally, and those who
self-identify as people with psychosocial disabilities, represent a heterogeneous group who
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have made a wide range of critiques of the MGMH (a point which will be elaborated later).
However, several points are made consistently across these groups: an assertion of a right to
define their own distress and to choose the type of healing spaces they find most useful, and a
call for the inclusion of “experts by experience” in all phases of the MGMH (Mills &
Fernando, 2014).
The lack of inclusion of service-user, survivor, and psychosocial disability groups has
been a recurring issue throughout the development of the MGMH. In 2011, the Pan-African
Network of Persons with Psychosocial Disabilities (PANUSP)–formerly the Pan African
Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry–produced the Cape Town Declaration, which
declared, “There can be no mental health without our expertise. We are the knowers and yet
we remain the untapped resource in mental health care. We are the experts. We want to be
listened to and to fully participate in our life decisions” (PANUSP, 2011). In response to the
“Grand Challenges to Global Mental Health” project, Shukla et al. (2012) reiterate this
message: “Developing appropriate frameworks for mental health requires active
collaboration with local communities and with those who have personal experience of mental
health problems.” Yet, “The Delphi panel was not representative of these stakeholders” (p.
4). The lack of inclusion in the Grand Challenges to Global Mental Health report was then
exacerbated by Nature’s refusal to print the critical letter, providing further evidence of the
unwillingness of the psy-disciplines to hear the voices and concerns of people with lived
experience.
Evidence Exaggerates Prevalence
The critical response to the Grand Challenges report in Nature suggests that the
epidemiological data used by the MGMH “is also questionable and could grossly exaggerate
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the global burden of mental disorders” (Shukla et al., 2012, p. 4). Indeed, critics have
suggested that prevalence figures, such as those concluding that depression is the leading
cause of disability worldwide (Friedrich, 2017), “insult our common sense and everyday
experience” (Summerfield, 2012, p. 520). The estimates of the MGMH are based on the
assumption that psychiatric constructs, developed by Western psy-disciplines and most often
developed and tested on Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD)
samples, can adequately capture the experiences of “madness” or mental distress in diverse
cultural settings (Schulz et al., 2018). As Summerfield (2017) writes, using instruments that
assume a “’mental disorder’ is an entity essentially lying outside situation, society and
culture, which is identifiable anywhere using a common (Western) methodology,” “cannot be
redeemed by reliability–using a standard reproducible method–since the very ground they
stand on is unsound” (Summerfield, 2017, p. 52).
Even when assuming the cross-cultural appropriateness of using Western diagnostic
constructs in non-Western settings, epidemiological analyses have criticized the GBD studies
for the value judgments inherent in DALY metrics, the low quality of data in LMICs without
robust health surveillance systems, and the uncritical use of the GBD estimates in academic
studies and policies (Brhlikova et al., 2011). In the case of depression estimates, the GBD
data were generated using a wide range of different measures and scales, which often did not
allow for the use of clinical judgement in screening or diagnosis. Some screening instruments
may vary significantly in the likelihood of identifying depression (Levis et al., 2018), the
seven common depression rating scales share only 12% of the symptoms across all
instruments (Fried, 2016), and many scales are inconsistent with DSM-5 diagnostic criteria
for major depressive disorder (MDD) (Fried, 2017). The use of structured vs. semi-structured
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instruments may also substantially affect depression estimates: “In general population
samples, where depressive symptom levels are generally low, major depression prevalence
has been found to be substantially higher when fully structured interviews are used versus
semi-structured interviews” (Levis et al., 2018, p. 6). The most common depression measures
used in the GBD study, the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS) and the Composite
Diagnostic Interview Schedule (CIDI), are highly standardized and structured interviews,
often conducted by laypeople (Brhlikova et al., 2011). Almost the entirety of validation
studies for the CIDI were completed in Western samples, and its cross-cultural reliability and
validity have been challenged (Ferrari et al., 2013). Moreover, GBD data from LMICs in
South-East Asia and Africa was often not based on nationally representative samples and was
extrapolated from studies from a small area, or even a single village (Brhlikova et al., 2011).
The individualistic focus of the MGMH is evident in the lack of attention to forms of
community distress, which is different from the sum of the distress of individual members
(Fernando, 2012). A perspective on global mental health that took social and collective
distress as its object, rather than individual pathology, might differentiate thriving
communities from distressed communities and identify structural and environmental risk
factors for collective distress that are amenable to political intervention rather than
individualized treatment (Campbell & Burgess, 2012).
A Focus on the Brain Obscures Context and Lived Experience
The MGMH framing of mental disorders as having a “physical basis in the brain,” and
“truly universal” (Sayers, 2001, p. 1085, as cited in Mills, 2018), has been opposed and
contested by critical psychiatrists and psychologists, transcultural psychiatrists, and those
with lived experience of psychiatric treatment (Mills & Fernando, 2014). Critics contend
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that the framing of mental distress as illness or brain disorders obscures the cultural
differences in mental and emotional life and obscures the social determinants of mental
health.
The social determinants of mental health are the social, economic, and material factors
that affect the mental health of communities (Raven, 2013). A 2014 analysis by the WHO
concluded that political, social, environmental, and economic situations have powerful
effects on mental well-being. Discrimination, poverty, unemployment, low educational
opportunity, lack of social support, and lack of trust in others are all linked to higher levels of
psychological distress (WHO, 2014). The cultural and social contexts of a community shape
the ways in which people respond to - and make meaning of - their material conditions.
Summerfield (2008) refers to the difficulty of measuring “mental health in a broken
social world” where “structural poverty and injustice, violent conflict, debt repayments,
shifting weather patterns, environmental degradation, and inadequate budgets for health,
education, and social welfare provide a barely viable social context for millions of people”
(p. 993). He points to research suggesting that the mental health of refugees is strongly
moderated by social conditions after displacement and the resolution of the conflict,
suggesting that the “mental phenomena being identified as satisfying criteria for a mental
disorder (typically depression or post-traumatic stress disorder) were mostly incidental and a
normal reaction to their circumstances” (p. 993).
Prevalence estimates in the GBD study reveal that anxiety disorders are significantly
higher in populations exposed to conflict compared to non-conflict populations (Baxter et al.,
2013). However, the WHO survey found that anxiety disorders were most common in nonconflict countries like the United States (10.1%). This discrepancy in the findings has been
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attributed to the WHO’s “use of nationally representative sampling frames in contrast to
other studies where single regions (possibly one known to have been exposed to direct
conflict) were selected” (Baxter et al., 2013, p. 11).
Pointing to the influence of relative inequality on mental health, the WHO report quotes
Amartya Sen’s insight that, “Relative deprivation in the space of incomes can yield absolute
deprivation in the space of capabilities” (Sen, 1992, as quoted in WHO, 2014, p. 35). Indeed,
research has found that as the level of living standards decline, the level of psychological
distress increases (Foulds et al., 2014) and that levels of income inequality are predictive of
the prevalence of a range of mental health conditions–from depression to schizophrenia
(Pickett et al., 2006; Burns et al., 2014). This insight makes clear that risk factors for mental
distress must also be understood within context, as comparisons of absolute economic assets
and mental health would miss the influence of relative inequality within a community, and
the social and political dynamics that inform how inequality is encountered and understood.
For example, in 2010, population-level data revealed that India accounted for one-fifth of
suicides globally, and that suicide rates in India were much higher in rural areas than urban
areas (Patel et al., 2012). Ethnographic and qualitative studies of this phenomenon pointed to
the role played by public policies and an “agrarian crisis” in the rise in farmer suicides in
rural India (Deshpande & Arora, 2010). However, the population data appeared to belie this
explanation, as agricultural workers did not appear to be at a higher risk for suicide than
professionals, laborers, and non-workers. As Kennedy and King (2014) point out, the
quantitative analysis failed to account for the fact that the occupational categories did not
accurately capture the work lives of rural Indians, as it is common for struggling farmers to
engage in wage-labor. Indeed, after a reanalysis of the data, it was farmers in a very
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particular socio-economic situation–with high debt loads, cash crops, and marginal holdings–
who were at a heightened risk for suicide, as suggested in the qualitative studies (Kennedy &
King, 2014). Additionally, the introduction of genetically modified crops by large
transnational corporations has worsened these issues, leaving farmers with more debt and
making them more vulnerable to risks from non-sustainable farming practices (Shiva et al.,
1998). This example suggests that large quantitative studies can easily miss the contextual
dynamics driving mental health issues; in the case of Indian farmers, depression and suicide
might be said to have more to do with socio-economic circumstances and the chemicals in
the soil than the chemicals in the brain.
Indigenous Healing Practices Were Not Considered
Shukla et al. (2012) argue not only that socio-political issues are individualized and
pathologized by diagnosis, but that the discourse of the MGMH may adversely alter local
practices. The uncritical application of narrowly biological approaches to mental health may
prevent the application of resources to projects aimed at social transformation and local,
culturally informed forms of healing (Davar & Lohokare, 2009).
Critics have also attacked the MGMH for reproducing colonial power structures, by
defining and implementing mental health in a top-down manner from the Global North (or
high income countries; HICs) to the Global South (or low and middle income countries;
LMICs). In doing so, MGMH ignores local understandings and forms of distress while
failing to consider, and thus marginalizing, traditional healing practices (Davar, 2014).
Moreover, the standard for what constitutes acceptable forms of evidence–namely
randomized controlled trials–effectively prevents cultural groups with alternative ways of
knowing and/or lacking the means to conduct these studies from contributing alongside the
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Western psychiatric evidence base used to inform the MGMH (Summerfield, 2004). In the
effort to educate non-Western populations about evidence-based mental health concepts and
treatments, Summerfield sees an urge toward “medical imperialism, similar to the
marginalisation of indigenous knowledge systems in the colonial era” (2008, p. 993).
It is striking how often published studies of non-Western populations refer to subjects’
‘‘limited knowledge of mental disorders’’, their lack of ‘‘mental health literacy’’, or the
need to ‘‘teach’’ health workers and the people they serve about mental health. Thus,
non-Western subjects are meant to understand ‘‘us’’, rather than the other way round, and
their own cultural frameworks are likely to be seen as an obstacle to this understanding
(Summerfield, 2012, p. 525).
The globalization of mental health discourses from high-income countries is rapidly eclipsing
local healing traditions, as well as indigenous ways of expressing and experiencing emotional
distress (Gone, 2016). Current attempts to promote mental health literacy through the
MGMH do not sufficiently engage with local or folk understandings of the mind and mental
distress (Kirmayer & Pederson, 2014). One perhaps paradigmatic example is captured by the
anthropological observation that the psychiatric construct of somatization, the tendency to
express psychological conflicts in physiological terms, is incompatible with Japanese cultural
understandings of the interconnectedness of body and mind (Kirmayer, 1989).
Funding For Programs Should Not Come From Pharma
There are a number of vested interests that shape research on the nature of mental health
issues and the treatments and interventions designed to address them (Whitaker & Cosgrove,
2015). The interests of the pharmaceutical industry, in particular, have shaped the knowledge
and practices of the psy-disciplines and consequently, the MGMH, in both subtle and explicit
ways (Kirmayer & Raikhel, 2009). Pharmaceutical companies have had a direct and
corrupting influence on the research base of psychiatry by inflating reports of medication
effectiveness and downplaying adverse effects through academic-industry partnerships,
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ghostwriting, perverse incentive structures, and the manipulation of regulatory authority
through institutional corruption (Healy, 2004; Cosgrove et al., 2018). The MGMH is
currently engaging in clinical trials across the globe to evaluate the effectiveness and safety
of different psychiatric and psychosocial interventions in different communities and cultures.
This research has the potential to significantly expand the markets of the pharmaceutical
industry, and this incentive in turn has the potential to lead to a substantial corruption of the
evidence if appropriate steps are not taken (Roberts, 2020).
Little attention has been paid to the forces that brought about the global mental health
framework and its connection to the World Bank and pharmaceutical industry. However, as
Bemme and D’souza (2014) note, the infrastructure for the MGMH was deliberate and
orchestrated. Starting in the 1980s when the World Bank began investing in population
health as an economic investment, “the WHO subsequently saw itself increasingly side-lined
by the World Bank’s funding power and programmatic direction,” and shifted direction
toward “Global Health,” moving away from “social projects” toward “global health
interventions as projects conceptualizing health in biological and economic terms” (p. 853).
Industry also exerts an undue influence more broadly through the marketing of
pharmaceutical products, disease mongering, and the psychiatrization of everyday life (Mills,
2014; Rose, 2016). As a result, the discursive frameworks produced by the psy-disciplines
often unwittingly aid and abet neoliberal agendas that make individuals solely responsible for
their distress (Esposito & Perez, 2014). The subtle impacts of industry practices on daily life
around the globe work in tandem with other global economic and political trends toward
privatization and neoliberalism (Cosgrove & Karter, 2018). By describing health within a
biological and economic framework, the MGMH is consistent with the neoliberal aim of
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bringing social life under the evaluation of the market (Moncrieff, 2008), encouraging
individuals to see themselves as “neurochemical selves,” and thinking of “their moods and
their ills in terms of the functioning of their brain chemicals” (Rose 2003, p. 28).
Uncritical Assumption that Human Rights Violations are More Common in the Global
South and the West Must Intervene
Shukla et al. (2012) took issue with “the picture of a black girl chained to a tree on the
front of the article in Nature” which “suggests that rights violations are a more prevalent
issue in non-Western countries.” They add, “Mental health service delivery has involved
rights violations across the globe (e g, use of seclusion, restraint, high dose medication)” (p.
4). This criticism echoes the attention to the top-down power dynamics of the MGMH where
Western knowledge is valued as superior, reminiscent of “the White man’s burden” approach
to aid whereby Western experts “can solve world poverty by bringing their superior technical
knowledge to the locals” (Easterly, 2006, p. 2060).
A recent WHO investigation of the conditions of adults with psychosocial and intellectual
disabilities in Europe found that only one in four psychiatric institutions, out of 75 facilities
across 24 countries, met international standards for human rights (WHO, 2018). The
standards were based on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), the “first comprehensive and legally binding international framework
for psychosocial disability” (Drew et al., 2011, p. 2). The WHO investigation found a
general lack of appreciation for mental health and human rights among staff, the lack of
humane and personalized treatment plans, the lack of plans for improvement or recovery, and
the lack of access to simple activities like reading, calling loved ones, or watching TV
(WHO, 2018). In addition, the report describes egregious incidents of gross neglect,
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isolation, and sexual abuse (WHO, 2018). The results of this report, combined with the
evidence that “human rights violations against people with psychosocial disabilities occur in
all countries irrespective of income level,” (Drew et al., 2011, p. 1) may beg the question:
“Has psychiatry been such a success here [in HIC’s] to entitle us to export it all over the
world?” (Mills, 2014, p. 3).
Mental Health Activists with Lived Experience
So far, we have referred broadly to people with lived experiences as serviceusers/consumers, psychiatric survivors, and people with psychosocial disabilities or the
psychosocially disabled. The involvement of these groups in activist movements in the field
of mental health is often referred to collectively as consumer, survivor, or ex-patient (C/S/X)
perspectives (Schrader et al., 2013). The majority of C/S/X advocacy and scholarship has
developed out of the Global North in response to the forms the psy-disciplines have taken
within a Western context. Meanwhile, psychosocial disability has largely emerged as an
identity within the Global South up to this point. While these identities are sometimes
invoked interchangeably, and group membership is often overlapping and collaborative, they
entail somewhat different philosophies and positions within the field of mental health
activism. An overview of these differing C/S/X perspectives and identities can shed light on
how psychosocial disability might extend and/or break with the other movements.
The designation “psychiatric survivor” is an identity taken up by those who “have
experienced abuse and/or oppression in the mental health system, and thus have survived
psychiatry itself rather than a diagnosis of mental illness per se” (Adame, 2014, p. 457).
Psychiatric survivors trace their grassroots activism to the antipsychiatry movement of the
1970s (Hornstein, 2009) and aim for liberation from the psychiatric system and medical
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model of mental illness, rather than empowerment within it (Chamberlin, 1978). For this
reason, psychiatric survivors organize groups positioned outside of the psychiatric system,
including MindFreedom (e.g., www.mindfreedom.org), the National Association for Rights
Protection and Advocacy, the National Empowerment Center, and Vermont Psychiatric
Survivors, to name a few. These survivor groups have developed alternatives to the
mainstream mental health system like peer-run support groups, respite homes for people in
distress, and medication-free facilities, while protesting and taking legal action against
coercive practices such as forced medicating, solitary confinement, and commitment
(Chamberlin, 2004). However, some psychiatric survivors have entered the field of
psychotherapy “to be the kind of therapist they would have wanted in periods of acute
distress” and “to further the aim of the survivor movement through supporting the creation of
alternatives, ongoing activist efforts to protest psychiatric human rights violations, and
practicing a broadly humanistic (and existential) approach to working with clients” (Adame,
2014, p. 458).
Psychiatric survivors are differentiated from mental health service-user and consumer
groups, “who are more oriented toward psychiatric reform and have also sometimes
experienced psychiatric services as helpful” (Hölling, 2001, p. 103, as quoted in Adame,
2014). Survivor groups have taken issue with the tendency of user/consumer advocates to
work on reforms to the mental health system from within by taking paid positions as peersupport workers. The recovery movement, which takes a strength-based approach to mental
health treatment, has pushed for an incorporation of service-users into the mental health
system (Davidson, 2005; Davidson et al., 2012), adding the designations “peer worker” or
“peer specialist.” However, some survivor groups have contested the framing of the recovery
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movement, and the implication that there is something wrong that needs to be recovered from
(Harper & Speed, 2014). Nevertheless, survivors and users do collaborate toward similar
aims through organizations such as the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry
(WNUSN).
Psychosocial disability organizations emerging in the Global South have selfconsciously positioned themselves within the disability movement, rather than as survivors or
opponents of the Western psy-disciplines (Davar, 2008). The disability framework straddles
the contested territory between survivors and user/consumers groups by approaching mental
distress as disabling only in the context of a failed socio-political response to suffering. In
this respect, psychosocial disabilities are not individual medical illnesses but experiences that
become disabling as a result of inadequate social supports (Carroll et al., 2016). The
psychosocial disability framework promotes the principle of inclusion, calling for the
participation of people with psychosocial disabilities in all phases of mental health research
and practice, similar to user/consumers and peers within the recovery movement.
Psychosocial disability advocacy groups also take up projects toward the goal of social
transformation, often working within and across groups with different lived experience
identities. For example, the Seher programme of Bapu Trust, India, Transforming
Communities for Inclusion, and Pan African Network of People with Psychosocial
Disabilities (PANUSP, 2012) have each engaged in activism, on both grassroots organizing
and policy levels, in relation to the Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH). The
emergence of these groups of people with psychosocial disabilities may signal a shift away
from mental health advocates organizing under the user and survivor labels. Indeed, as
mentioned above, PANUSP previously designated the Pan African Network of Users and
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Survivors of Psychiatry; however, organizers changed their name to the Pan African Network
of People with Psychosocial Disabilities (PANPPD, often still referred to as PANSUP). The
psychosocial disability label was understood to be more inclusive of people who had no
access to services and who were therefore not “users” or “survivors” of such services (Robb,
2012).
Psychosocial Disability and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Those conceptualizing lived experience of madness or mental distress as psychosocial
disability connect their experiences to the central tenet of the cross-disability rights
movement, captured in the dictum, “nothing about us, without us” (Charlton, 1998; Cohen &
Timimi, 2008). This phrase has teeth, as the inclusion of disabled people accessing services
in the design and implementation of those services has become international human rights
law. The formal adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) by the United Nations in 2006 marked an important shift in the expectations on
governments with regard to their policies surrounding persons living with psychosocial
disabilities, from recipients of welfare to people entitled to equality and protection under the
law (Hoffman et al., 2016).
The CRPD is informed by a “social model” of disability whereby psychosocial
disabilities are understood not as an intrinsic deficit located within the individual, but as a
result of systemic barriers to full participation in society that are extrinsic to the person
(Price, 2013). This stands in sharp contrast to the medical model, which in addition to
viewing people diagnosed with “mental illness” as intrinsically deficient, positions medical
treatment as a necessary intervention. Within this particular discursive formation, which
frames those diagnosed with mental health issues as “lacking capacity” to manage their own
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treatment and personal lives, policies have prioritized medical interventions over the right to
informed consent and denial of treatment (Gooding, 2013). The CRPD instead defines
disability as “an evolving concept” that “results from the interaction between persons with
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others” and accordingly, prioritizes an
individual’s right to have control over their own treatment decisions. It states, “Every person
with disabilities has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal
basis with others” (United Nations, 2006, Art 17).
The CRPD and the rise of the social model of psychosocial disability has been hailed as
an important step toward shifting the legal and ethical conceptions of mental health issues
around the world. For example, the WHO launched the QualityRights project in 2012 to
transform mental health services worldwide in compliance with the CRPD. Part of this
initiative entailed capacity building, such as aiding in the development and training of local
and international organizations of people with psychosocial disabilities (Funk et al., 2017).
However, the majority of national and local policy and practices lag considerably behind
(Hoffman et al., 2016). Some in the psy-disciplines have reacted to this rights-based
approach with dismissal and scorn (see, e.g., Dharmawardene & Menkes, 2018). In
particular, the CRPD committee’s statement that involuntary psychiatric treatment and
denying legal capacity violates the Convention (Art. 12; 14) has been criticized by several
psychiatric associations (Minkowitz, 2006), and some have attempted to position the CRPD
and associated disability movement as radical so that they “may be shut out of domestic and
international policy efforts” (Wildeman, 2013, p. 50).
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As outlined above, the MGMH has failed to take seriously the voices, perspectives, and
participation of those with lived experience from the outset (see discussion of Shukla et al.,
2012). Unfortunately, this failure continues despite the influence of the CRPD. Following the
2018 Lancet Commission report presented at the inaugural Global Ministerial Mental Health
Summit in London, a coalition of mental health activists and service users organized an open
letter detailing their concerns (NSUN, 2018). The letter raises several concerns with the
positioning of the summit, but a central issue was the lack of representation and participation
of mental health activists and those with lived experience in the development of the program:
Significantly, there has been little or no involvement of organisations led by mental
health service users, survivors and persons with psychosocial disabilities in the
thinking, planning and design of this event. While a few networks were approached to
provide ‘experts by experiences’ to attend panels on themes already decided on, there
has been no meaningful consultation or involvement of user-led and disabled people’s
organisations not already signed up to the ‘Movement for Global Mental Health’
agenda or funding to enable a wide range of representatives to attend (NSUN, 2018).
To sum up, the psychosocial disability discourse challenges the predominant
discourses and practices of the psy-disciplines on both conceptual and structural grounds. An
understanding of psychosocial disability as arising amidst a complex interaction between
individuals and their environmental contexts, cultural attitudes, and societal barriers has the
potential to disrupt the universal and acontextual account of madness and mental health
inherent in the MGMH, and the psy-disciplines more broadly (see e.g., Spandler &
Anderson, 2015). It also shifts the ethical and legal responsibility for disability away from an
individual deficit to be overcome through medical intervention, and toward the forces of
structural oppression that differentially afford health and illness (Dirth & Adams, 2019). In
the context of the MGMH, the psychosocial disability framework may actively work against
the (neo)colonial implications of scaling up concepts and treatments developed in the West,
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by decolonizing assumptions about what constitutes normative or natural forms of
subjectivity.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

This chapter begins with a brief discussion on qualitative research in psychology and
then proceeds with a review of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), the chosen
method for the study. The specific research steps including population studied, recruitment
methods, data collection and analysis, informed consent and credibility checks. Lastly,
researcher self-reflexivity is discussed.
Qualitative Methodology
Researchers utilizing qualitative methods seek descriptive elucidation of lived
experience through methods of interviewing and observing, as well as various forms of
interpreting experiences; that is, they are interested in the meaning-making process of lived
experience (Creswell et al., 2007; van Manen, 1990). Conducting qualitative research in
psychology involves gathering rich and evocative data to better understand how individuals
make sense of their world and their experiences (Coyle, 2007). In short, qualitative
researchers “investigate what is experienced and how it is experienced” (Wertz, 2011, p.
125).
An important facet of qualitative research in psychology is the careful consideration
of the philosophical underpinnings and assumptions of a study. Dilthey (1894/1977, p. 27)
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made the distinction between natural science (Naturwissenschaften), which involves the
quantitative testing of natural phenomena occurring independent of experience, and human
science (Geisteswissenschaften), whereby psychological life is described and interpreted.
Qualitative research in psychology, as a human science, breaks with the positivist and postpositivist epistemologies common to quantitative methodologies, instead acknowledging the
role of social position and subjectivity in the research process, and viewing the production of
knowledge as inherently relational and co-constructed. As such, qualitative research involves
reflexivity, with the implication that researchers should report self-critical disclosure of their
interests, hypotheses, personal relationship with the subject matter and their intellectual and
ethical commitments (Wertz, 2011).
Critical Qualitative Research.
The central roles of positioning, reflexivity and relationality in the qualitative
research enterprise points to its inherently critical (not just philosophical) underpinnings.
Critical qualitative research in psychology prioritizes the perspectives, participation, and
lived experiences of people impacted by prevailing power inequities (Levitt et al., 2021;
Sandwick et al., 2018). However, critical qualitative methods do not flatten existing power
differentials within a research collaborative, but rather bring attention to the inherent tensions
of power and values in collaborations between researchers and activist communities (Fine et
al., 2021). In addition, the philosophy and practice of critical qualitative research can be
consistent with the ethos of the psychosocial disability movement in terms of prioritizing the
“right to research,” which allows communities that have been historically excluded to impact
policy formation (Appadurai, 2006). Importantly, the critical epistemology employed herein
is informed by approaches to critical qualitative research on “madness” developed by
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survivor-researchers, in that it seeks to disrupt normative and individualizing conceptions in
favor of a recontextualization of madness based on first-hand experience (Rose, 2021).
It is important to recognize, however, that research–particularly that conducted within
the psy-disciplines–has produced and sustained systems of oppression and epistemological
violence (Teo, 2010). Indeed, the academic industrial complex has led to appropriate
reticence and mistrust of research endeavors within both psychiatric user and survivor
communities as well as in historically colonized and indigenous populations (Tuck & Yang,
2014). Therefore, to the greatest extent possible, the researcher should engage in coparticipatory processes such as robust informed consent and acknowledgement of the
potential outcomes and risks. Further, inclusivity in each step of the process and a
willingness to diverge from prescribed psychological research methodologies if
circumstances demand is essential to ensuring co-creation and co-participation both with
research participants, and communities/organizations that they represent (some of which are
described below). In addition, the researcher must consider the possibility that traditionally
“psychological science” perspectives may prove inappropriate to accomplishing this
particular project, and remain open to alternative forms of exploration, expression, and action
that can facilitate or emerge from interaction with participants. The significance of these
alternative forms is bidirectional–not just resulting from interaction but enhancing those
interactions.
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is a qualitative methodology which
aims to explore in detail how participants make sense of their personal and social experiences
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(Smith & Osborn, 2008). IPA has its origins in phenomenology, hermeneutics, and
idiography (Smith & Eatough, 2007), each of which deserves a brief mention here.
Theoretical Roots of IPA
Phenomenology is a specialized process of reflection and description that attempts to
understand experience as it is immediately given; that is, not mediated by scientific
constructs, axiomatic presuppositions, so-called common sense, or experimentation (Husserl,
1913/1998). In this way, phenomenology produces emergent data that is rich with participant
experiences and perceptions and points to what makes a particular phenomenon unique
(Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014).
Hermeneutics, or what Ricoeur referred to the “theory of the operation of
understanding in its relation to the interpretation of text” (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 141), speaks to
the circular process whereby participants attempt to make sense of their own experience
while the researcher is simultaneously attending to the ways in which the participant is
engaging in meaning-making (Smith & Eatough, 2007). In IPA, this “double hermeneutic” is
explicitly recognized as an essential and unavoidable feature of the research.
Idiography refers to the focus on what is unique about an individual or a single
occurrence or event, and the attempt to provide a detailed description for the purpose of indepth understanding (Ponterotto, 2005). IPA is idiographic in the sense that it aspires to a
detailed examination of the lived experience presented in each individual case, even while
also attending to patterns across cases (Smith, 2011).
Stages of IPA
There are three steps to the IPA methodology: the epoché, the phenomenological
reduction, and the eidetic reduction. Within the phenomenological tradition, what Husserl
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called the epoché is an attempt toward bracketing, or putting aside, the natural attitude
(Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008); here, the goal is to remain continually aware of prejudices,
biases, and presuppositions (Giorgi, 2009). This bracketing is not easily accomplished, for
the natural attitude reveals that "I always find myself as someone who is perceiving,
objectivating in memory or in phantasy, thinking, feeling, desiring" (Husserl, 1913, p. 54).
We seem to assume, within the natural attitude, an “actuality” of existence (Husserl, 1913).
The natural attitude makes existence factual, self-evident and a "theory-independent reality"
(Zahavi, 2003, p. 44). The epoché, in contrast, can be used to make known the constitutive
function of human consciousness within everyday existence.
In the present study, the researcher attempted to bracket (Epoché) preconceptions
with the aid of auto-ethnographies. Auto-ethnography is a self-narrative that de-centers the
researcher as an authority holding the truth about others’ experiences (Cho & Trent, 2006;
Geertz, 1973). Giorgi (2009) explains that “…bracketing means that we should not let our
past knowledge be engaged while we are determining the mode and content of the present
experience” (p. 92). The researcher continued to use auto-ethnographies throughout the study
for interpersonal reflexivity, thereby better ensuring the bracketing of presuppositions as well
as validity within the research (see Walsh, 2003).
The second step, phenomenological reduction, includes procedures for returning to
the lived experiences of participants (“reduction” denotes the various types of coding
procedures, not the diminishment of said experience). This entails finding ways to gather and
analyze descriptive data within transcripts or field notes. Data are gathered through
interviewing, observing, participating (ethnography), discourse gathering and analysis, as
well as self-reflection. As Giorgi (2009) writes, “Philosophically speaking, this reduction is
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[…] more appropriate for psychological analyses of human beings since the purpose of
psychology as a human science is precisely the clarification of the meanings of phenomena
experienced by human persons” (p. 98). By the time this stage is complete, the researcher has
reduced each transcript, or set of field notes (observations) to sets of concepts.
Finally, the eidetic reduction further captures the data and describes it in terms of
themes or phenomenological essences. Concepts are compared between transcripts;
specifically, there is a triangulation of data as concepts derived from one transcript are
compared to another or concepts from one observation in the field (ethnography) are
compared to concepts from other observations. The eidetic reduction proceeds by way of
free imaginative variation in which the researcher imagines removing all that is non-essential
to the phenomenon. This is done by constantly comparing concepts between participants or
observations. The researcher places concepts together to see what changes regarding the
phenomenon, and then removes what is non-essential. Horizontalization is when the
researcher imaginatively places all descriptions of the experience (concepts) on one level,
and therefore does not give priority to any given concept (Giorgi, 2009). Once the data have
been reduced, themes are said to be structural invariants or phenomenological essences: that
which must be present for the phenomenon to exist as it is.
The above process is ongoing until the researcher reaches saturation. In IPA the
meaning of saturation differs from other qualitative methods, as the hermeneutic circle posits
that interpretation is iterative and cyclical, whereby data can repeatedly be analyzed in light
of new sources (Smith et al., 1999; 2009). In this context, saturation refers to the point where
themes are “represented in a way that achieves coherence and integration while preserving
nuances” (Elliot et al., 1999, p. 222-223).
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Participants
Due to the idiographic focus of IPA, it is common to utilize purposive sampling where
participants are selected based on prescribed theoretical criteria (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
While there is no preset number of participants, it is common for IPA studies to have small
samples; six to eight participants may be appropriate (Smith & Osborn, 2008).
For this study, I recruited eight participants identified as people with psychosocial disabilities
with previous experience of mental health treatment in countries located in the Global South.
The participants’ demographic data pertaining to age, ethnicity, gender, sexual-orientation,
age and duration of mental health treatment, and duration of advocacy was recorded. No one
was excluded based on age (if over 18 years), gender, race, or ethnicity.
Participants were recruited through existing partnerships with organizations that
identify, in whole or in part, as psychosocial disability advocacy organizations. The
researcher reached out via email to potential participants specifying the nature of the project
and type of volunteer needed, and asked interested individuals to email the researcher
directly in order to further protect confidentiality. They then completed a form to confirm
eligibility. All confidential information was stored on a secure, password-protected computer
in a password-encrypted file. Demographic forms were deleted and destroyed for any
participants who were initially recruited but did not end up meeting criteria. Recruitment
continued on an ongoing basis until eight participants had been confirmed.
Some of these eight were also recruited through word of mouth and snowball
sampling. Snowball sampling is a form of purposive sampling commonly used in IPA due to
its idiographic nature, which requires an intensive interpretive analysis of each case (Smith et
al., 2009). Here, the researcher targeted participants associated with a particular identity or
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experience, and then further recruited people through the associations and networks of these
participants (Robinson, 2014).
Upon recruitment, participants were provided with consent and demographic forms to
complete through Qualtrics prior to the interview, with the researcher available to answer any
questions they may have. A time was arranged to meet over video call to conduct a 60–90
minute interview, for which participants would be paid $30 USD, distributed via PayPal
within 48 hours. Beforehand, they were informed that this payment was not contingent upon
completing the entire study and that they may decline to answer questions or withdraw their
participation at any time and still receive payment. This information was outlined in written
informed consent documents and verbally re-iterated prior to interviews.
Data Collection
Participant interviews lasted 60-90 minutes and took place remotely. The interviews
were conducted using a secure video conferencing platform. Participants were interviewed
using semi-structured open-ended questions (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984; Seidman, 1998).
However, the interview format was semi-structured, with the researcher adding prompts and
additional questions; these were further revised following each interview for future
participants based on the experience of prior interviews. Interviews would begin with a set of
prompts based on the study’s formal research questions, as outlined in Chapter 1. This
method adheres to hermeneutic principles (such as the hermeneutic circle) within qualitative
research (Packer & Addison, 1989). The interviews were audio-recorded with the consent of
the participant, and process notes taken concurrently. All interviews were subsequently
transcribed verbatim.
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Data Analysis
Following transcription of interviews, the researcher engaged in several preliminary
readings and listened to the interview recording (immersion). An interpretive
phenomenological content analysis was then performed (Smith et al., 2009) on the data. This
analysis included sorting manifest or understood obvious content (e.g., declarative,
commands, qualifications), as well as coding latent content (words, strings of words,
clustered concepts) that may have multiple meanings. Themes across interviews were
identified and translated to a narrative account as part of the data analysis.
To accomplish this, each transcript was broken down into “meaning units” denoting
units of text that are convey a discrete thought or experience. Next, an iterative process of
constant comparative analysis, in a state of free imaginative variation, was utilized to
compare meaning units to one another and group them according to commonalities. Lowerorder or emergent themes were then constructed for each transcript based upon the meaning
units contained in that theme. The intent during this first level of analysis was to remain as
close to participants’ original descriptions as possible, with particular attention paid to the
language used (objective comments, metaphors, pauses, tone) when referring to the
experience. Throughout this process, an effort was made to account for every meaning unit in
lower-order themes. If a unit was unable to be captured by a theme, this was noted in a
journal of thoughts and reactions maintained throughout the analysis. When beginning a new
transcript, an attempt was made to bracket themes from previous cases.
The process of constant comparison, employing free imaginative variation, was
repeated for these various lower-order themes across transcripts to construct higher-order
themes. During this level of analysis, the researcher again attempted to use the language of
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the original meaning units whenever possible, while making a note of any idiosyncratic
lower-order themes that did not find convergence across cases. When constructing higherorder themes, the researcher considered those within societal, cultural, and theoretical
frameworks (double hermeneutic), attempting to make sense of participants’ sense-making
(Smith et al., 2009). Special attention was paid to metaphors and language use that would
allow themes to speak to the diversity of experiences across transcripts. These super-ordinate
themes make up the descriptive and interpretive findings reported in the research results and,
potentially, in a scholarly article.
Ethical Considerations
Participants retained the right to withdraw from this study at any time (i.e., consent
was an ongoing process). Name(s) or any other identifying information that could possibly
identify participants were not shared with anyone, with the exception of the researchers. All
potential identifying information of participants has been removed from transcriptions
immediately following the interview and transcription. Research records are stored securely.
All audio recordings were erased at the conclusion of the research project; however,
transcripts, content analysis and process notes, with identifying information stricken, will be
retained indeterminately.
Some or all of the information obtained in this research project may be used in
subsequent university classes, peer-reviewed articles, and professional/academic conference
presentations. Any released information will be de-identified, and no publication will contain
individualized interpretations of specific participants. Instead, interpretations reflect a
process of content analysis and methodological triangulation that represent shared and not
individual experiences.
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Informed Consent
The process of acquiring consent involved the following:
1. There was a preliminary discussion with potential participants about the purpose, risks,
and benefits of participation.
2. The researcher strove to convey information to participants such that they would be
expected to be able to demonstrate their understanding of the study procedures, risks, and
benefits in which they were agreeing to participate.
3. Acquiring consent included a discussion of:
• Data collection and storage
• De-identification (see below)
• Any limits to confidential information
• Nature and purpose of the research
• The expected duration of the interview
• The eligibility of the participant
• Any foreseeable risks or discomforts
• Any benefits to the participant or to others that can reasonably be expected
• Confidentiality of any records that identify the participant (see below)
• Sharing of contact information for the supervisor/researcher in the event of any further
questions about the research, ongoing consent, and confidentiality
Credibility Checks
The researcher has had training in skillful and respectful qualitative interviewing.
This involves an attempt to build rapport and create a relational atmosphere that encourages
openness, sharing, and meaningful reflection. Attention was paid to the researcher-participant
relationship, with the researcher journaling reflections on this throughout the interview.
Before concluding each interview, participants were asked two questions meant to assess
procedural integrity: 1) Was there anything that made it difficult to answer questions openly?
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and 2) Do you have any recommendations for future interviews? This feedback was used to
adapt subsequent interviews.
Throughout the data analysis, a committee member with methodological expertise
served as an advisor. A research assistant (another doctoral level student in psychology) was
employed (through grant funding for this project) to consult and review lower-order and
higher-order themes for fidelity to the original meaning units. Any questions or discrepancies
raised concerning the analysis were discussed and addressed through consensus procedures,
with the methodological expert assisting in making the final decision.
A written report was given to each participant outlining the invariant themes (no
direct and personal interpretations of participants will be provided); like all data and written
reports/papers, was de-identified. Participants were invited to review these preliminary
results and provide feedback, which was then incorporated into the analysis. The researcher
considered participant feedback in the construction of the results, assessing for
representativeness, numeracy, and consistency with other participants’ feedback. In the event
that conflicting interpretations of one or more of the themes arose, the methodological expert
and researcher resolved any discrepancy, noting this divergence in the results.
Researcher Reflexivity and Positionality
Qualitative research values transparency and researcher reflexivity in both data
collection and data analysis procedures. Methodological self-consciousness (Charmaz, 2017),
or an examination of the researcher’s social location, is identified as an important part of
promoting reflexivity (Harding, 1991) and emphasis on social positionality (Cho, Clarke,
Friese, & Washburn, 2017). These concepts are consistent with a critical qualitative
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epistemology that emphasizes that the researcher’s approach and methods, much like the
object of study, are informed by sociocultural context (Levitt et al., 2021).
While I have tracked my own expectations, reactions, and assumptions by journaling
throughout the interview and analysis, I also acknowledge that I come to this topic of study
due to personal and intellectual interests. I am a White cisgender heterosexual male in my
late twenties, who is currently a doctoral student in Counseling Psychology at the University
of Massachusetts-Boston. My social location is the context from which I approach the world
and I maintain and awareness of the social and cultural capital that make it possible for me to
conduct this research. I have past experience conducting qualitative research and with IPA in
particular. I have written previously in the academic literature and popular press about the
MGMH and have critiqued its methods and aims. I locate myself within a movement of
interdisciplinary social scientists who are working in opposition to hegemonic, bioreductionist, and universalist approaches to mental health that deemphasize social and
systemic issues. I am connected to networks of mental health activists with lived experience
through my writing and advocacy, particularly with the social justice oriented mental health
webzine Mad in America. In addition, I served as a research officer for the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Dainius Puras, from 2018-2020, further connecting
me to rights-based approaches to mental health and networks of researchers and people with
lived experience seeking to reform mental health care globally. These intellectual, ethical,
and political commitments inevitably influenced my approach to the research topic.
In addition, I do not identify myself as a person with a psychosocial disability or as a
person with lived experience of madness or mental distress, and I have not myself been
subject to institutionalization or forced treatment. In combination with my other visible
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identities, position in the Global North, and status as a researcher, I am positioned as an
“expert” rather than an “expert by experience.” These power dynamics inevitably shape the
course and content of the qualitative interviews conducted, potentially making certain topics
more salient and others less so, and influencing the language used. I attempted to address
these dynamics in interviews by acknowledging differences and through questions designed
to probe what might have been difficult to say. My position and lack of lived experience may
also limit my analysis. While developing a pipeline for lived experience researchers is
essential (a recommendation discussed later), I also believe that allied researchers can work
toward greater justice in theory and practice through an understanding and incorporation of
scholarship conducted by people with lived experience. For this reason, I worked to ground
myself in the writing and scholarship of C/S/X identified academics.
Based on my previous engagement with this topic, I was aware that psychosocial
disability advocates with lived experience may be opposed to the MGMH. At the same time,
I recognized that there are currently people living with mental and emotional distress that too
often go ignored or are mistreated and marginalized, and that the MGMH may contribute to
an improvement in current conditions for many. As a phenomenological researcher, I
attempted to bracket this prior knowledge. I was open to discovering what my participants
had to say about their experiences with the mental health system, their views of the MGMH,
and their proposals for alternatives.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

Consistent with the guidance on the presentation of IPA results (Smith et al., 2009),
superordinate themes are discussed here underpinned by their subthemes. The IPA analysis
revealed three superordinate themes, each of which are comprised of underlying emergent
themes. The themes are presented in a structure that provides narrative coherence to the
experience and highlights their relevance to the research questions (Table 1). Consistent with
the idiographic focus of IPA, an interpretive account of participants’ narratives and
experiences are depicted here without reference to the extant literature.
The three superordinate themes were titled: Journeying Through Different
Frameworks to Psychosocial Disability Identity; Under the Psychosocial Disability
Umbrella: (Re)negotiating Identities, Advocacy Goals, and Tensions; and Walking the
Tightrope During Tug of War: Global Mental Health, Barriers to Inclusion, and
Transformational Potential. The subthemes are not necessarily independent of one another
and, in some instances, meaning units contributed to more than one subtheme or
superordinate theme.
Supporting quotations are provided and participants are identified by number (e.g.,
Participant 1, Participant 2) to maintain confidentiality. Results of the analysis are
summarized in Table 1. In addition, characteristics that would potentially break anonymity
for participants have been left out of the demographic information in Table 2. For example,
instead of reporting the country of each participant, only their region is identified. However,
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as information about the countries referenced may be important to delimiting the scope of
this analysis, they are reported together here in alphabetical order: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru, South Africa, and Uganda. Additionally, two of the eight participants
reported a marginalized identity related to sexual orientation, with one identifying as Lesbian
and the other as Bisexual, but this information will not be connected to their other identifying
characteristics to further protect their anonymity and reduce the risk of targeted
discrimination.
The participants were all people with lived experience of mental distress and mental
health treatment in the Global South who had organized their advocacy efforts under the
psychosocial disability framework. In addition, all participants had familiarity with the
Movement for Global Mental Health, and the majority had extensive experience engaging
directly with major players in the MGMH in efforts to review or shape policies, practices,
and goals. The number of years that the participants had been involved in mental health
related advocacy ranged from 4 years to 20 years, with an average of 9 years. As such, the
themes presented here represent the perspectives of leaders of the psychosocial disability
advocacy movement from the Global South in the context of the MGMH.
Six of the eight participants responded to a follow-up survey eliciting their feedback
on summaries of each of the three superordinate themes. Participants were asked to rate how
well each of the three superordinate themes represented their experience on a scale from 1
(not at all) to 10 (very much) and to provide comments on how the theme might be improved.
For those that responded, all three themes received above average scores, indicating their
acceptability as well as their summaries (8.6, 8, and 8.8, respectively); among the six
respondents there were no significant outliers. A total of 5 comments was received from
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participants and their points of clarification were incorporated into the analysis. These
comments largely elaborated on the summarized findings and added increased nuance to the
perspectives, which is captured in the results that follow.
TABLE 1: Superordinate Themes and Emergent Themes Across Study Participants
I. Journeying Through Different Frameworks to Psychosocial Disability Identity
1. Mental Distress Meets the Biomedical Model
2. Seeking Recovery and Engaging in Advocacy
3. Encountering the CRPD and Psychosocial Disability
II. Under the Psychosocial Disability Umbrella: (Re)negotiating Identities,
Advocacy Goals, and Tensions
1. Rethinking Identity as a Rights-Holder
2. Strategic Positioning and the Paradigm Shift
3. Uneasy Alliances Under the Psychosocial Disability Umbrella
4. Solidarity and Shared Goals Among Psychosocial Disability Advocates
III. Walking the Tightrope During Tug of War: Global Mental Health, Barriers to
Inclusion, and Transformational Potential
1. Power Imbalances in the Movement for Global Mental Health
2. Resisting Tokenization and Co-option and Pushing for Full Inclusion
3. Transforming Global Mental Health and Ending Traumatic Practices

TABLE 2: Participant Demographics
Sex Race/ethnicity Region

Years of
advocacy
10

Participant 1

M

Latinx

Participant 2

F

Black/African

South
America
Africa
4

Participant 3

F

White

Africa

18

Participant 4

M

Black/African

Africa

20

Participant 5

F

Black/African

Africa

5

Participant 6

F

Latinx

Participant 7

M

Black/African

Central 5
America
Africa
8

Participant 8

M

Latinx
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Central 7
America

Journeying Through Different Frameworks to Psychosocial Disability Identity
Participants described a personal journey toward identifying as a person with a
psychosocial disability. This journey was varied and complex, but participants’ narratives
consistently identified certain key experiences and realizations along this path. The journey
began with an experience of mental distress or suffering that ultimately brought them into
contact with formalized mental health services. In these services, they experienced what they
saw as a biomedical approach to their distress, which provided a framework for making sense
of their experience. Over time, however, this approach was experienced as limited or even
harmful, and participants began to seek out different supports and approaches to recovery.
Through their own recovery, and the insights gleaned through their journey so far, the
participants developed a desire to get involved in reforming and improving the mental health
field. All participants found their way to organizations that included other people with lived
experience. Their experience as advocates revealed further problems with the mental health
system, but also exposed the limits of the approaches to mental health advocacy they were
working within. During this process, participants became aware of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) and psychosocial disability framework.
Participants saw the potential for this new framework to enact widespread change to mental
health systems internationally, and began to organize their advocacy efforts under the
umbrella term of “people with psychosocial disabilities.”
Mental Distress Meets the Biomedical Model
All participants described an experience of “crisis,” “madness,” or “mental distress”
that made carrying on with day-to-day living impossible, at least temporarily. These
experiences were strongly influenced by the complexities of their lives up until this point,
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including their cultural and spiritual beliefs, family dynamics, and the political and economic
realities of their local contexts. In one example, Participant 7 described how, after his father
died when he was young, the expectation in his local culture was that he would “rise up to
take care of the family,” which “placed a huge burden and a struggle” on him throughout his
life. He connects the stress he took on due to this particular cultural and familial arrangement
to the emergence of “back and joint pains” that the local doctors diagnosed as
psychosomatic, referring him to a psychiatrist. Similarly, several participants had experiences
of hallucinations and delusions that they connected with prior spiritual beliefs or understood
in spiritual terms. Participant 6 described her first experience of “madness” as emerging out
of spiritual experience connected to giving birth:
“I had a very deep spiritual experience 10 days after my baby was born. And if you
ask the woman that diagnosed me, she's going to say that was the beginning. That was
the first sign of my illness. But there's nobody that can convince me otherwise. I
know it wasn't... After my baby was born, it changed me. It changed the way I see
things. And then seven months later, I saw the other side of the coin. So, I knew there
was plenty that was out of balance, but I knew it wasn't an illness. Even though they
told me that, deep in my core, I knew, but I also knew that I had to be quiet and kind
of be cooperative and not share too much.” (Participant 6)
The above quote also hints at the tension between the way the participants made
meaning of their distress and the way that mental health professionals understood them. For
each participant, the mental distress or break with everyday reality led to an encounter with
the mental health system and psychiatry, some through voluntary outpatient services (3 out of
8 participants) and others through involuntary hospitalization (5 out of 8 participants). All
participants, however, described the mental health system they encountered as primarily
taking a “biomedical” approach to their distress based around psychiatric diagnosis and
medication. The effect of encountering a biomedical mental health framework for explaining
their experiences varied between participants and within participant narratives over time.
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Several participants described access to this system as a “privilege” in the Global South and
some recognized benefits, at least initially, to having a label or “framework” for making
sense of what they were going through. For instance, Participant 1 explained how the
biomedical explanation of their bipolar diagnosis initially reduced blame and offered the
benefit of a clear solution, but they eventually came to see this explanation as disempowering
and incomplete:
“I think with bipolar disorder, doctors are very attached to, ‘there is a chemical
imbalance here. We need to, you need to take medication.’ There is some relief from
that. The question is how much that will last. Because… every time you're reminded
that this is a life condition, that this will never go away, you have to live with this,
this is very similar to having diabetes, it's very similar to a cardiovascular condition,
and you need to take your medication and you will be fine… you are told all of that,
and of course that doesn't help, because also at the same time, you have a very fatalist
view of … can I keep working? Can I keep doing things?” (Participant 1)
Similarly, medication was seen as having the potential to provide relief in the midst of crisis
or intensification of symptoms. For Participant 1, being “highly medicated” led to “this
feeling that you feel that is not healthy, but at the same time, I mean, you don't want to kill
yourself anymore, because basically you want nothing.” As a result, he had “mixed feelings
about medication” and began to come off the psychiatric drugs he had been prescribed,
initially with the help of a doctor and then, eventually, completing the taper against medical
advice. Beyond the immediate effects of medication, the focus on a biomedical description
and solution got in the way of looking at the social and psychological factors contributing to
his distress. Participant 1’s narrative exemplifies how the biomedical mental health narrative
can preclude the possibility of psychosocial support. He explained that one of his doctors
“told me not to do therapy,” and that the psychiatrist told him that he “felt that there is no
point of talking about what you're feeling or trying to explain what brought you here, because
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this is a purely chemical issue,” adding that, “If you just keep talking about this, it may
confuse you more.”
The experience of being positioned as lacking insight or treated as if they could not
play an active role in their own recovery, as captured in the above quote, was noted even by
the participants who reported finding a psychiatric diagnosis and medication helpful. Despite
viewing psychiatric intervention and medication as essential to their recovery, these
participants also saw the strictly biomedical approach they often encountered as either
insufficient on its own or actively harmful when their autonomy and dignity was neglected.
Participant 4 described identifying with her schizophrenia diagnosis, and stated that she has
found her medication regimen essential to her functioning. However, she lamented the sole
focus on medication and lack of attention to the social factors that contributed to her distress
and the discrimination and systemic barriers that prevented her recovery:
“Since I entered the mental health system, first of all, it was very, medical model. It
was very much focused on that. I mean the first point of entry was it was immediately
prescribing medication. It wasn't for me to look at all aspects of my life. It was so
focused on the medical problem. Wasn't looking at, you know, how let's say my
family relationships, because it wasn't very good at that time. How was that impacting
on me? How am I to work? There should have been reasonable accommodations or
things put in place to retain me in the workplace, because for me, my work is my
purpose. It gives me purpose… it's kind of an element to recovering.” (Participant 4)
Navigating alternative understandings of their own experience while in the mental health
system proved daunting and three participants brought up having to hide their views from
their providers and even reducing or stopping medications against medical advice. For all
participants, negative experiences with the biomedical model led to questioning the current
mental health system and seeking alternative frameworks for recovery and then advocacy
work. Participant 4 put it this way:
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“I experienced a lot of abuse within a psychiatric hospital setting… and just the
conditions were not conducive… I came to a point where I realized that, you know,
all the gaps within the system and all the wrongs and things that don't work, but
should work… those experiences that I had in the journey that followed was basically
what led to my career in mental health advocacy.” (Participant 4)
Seeking Recovery and Engaging in Advocacy
Participants sought out psychosocial forms of healing such as peer support,
psychotherapy, spiritual communities, and advocacy groups, which were central to their
recovery process. These communities and psychosocial resources facilitated a new
perspective on their experience. Five of the eight participants noted connecting in some way
with other people having lived experience, opening up new ways of making sense of
themselves and their experiences, and contributing to their recovery. Participant 8 explained:
“My situation started to change when I had access to other forms of understanding
these experiences associated with mental disorders or psychosocial disabilities,
specifically, beginning to be connected with other people with my same condition
through peer support.” (Participant 8)
While peer support groups differed in their makeup and philosophy, one commonality
reported by participants was their non-hierarchical approach. The acceptance they found
among other people with lived experience contrasted with their experience in the mental
health system. Participants attributed their healing and recovery directly to this experience of
being treated as an equal and included in a community. For example, Participant 4 described
their recovery in such a community:
“But what has helped me is, along the journey, I met a group that identified as mad
people. When I reached there, what I got there was, there was love, this was not
fiction, I was accepted as I am. And people were willing to help me be better, to listen
to me. So that helped me. To feel loved, to feel a community, to feel on an equal basis
with others. That's what it means you to know that I'm actually unique. I cannot be
exactly like others, but that was healing. I know I felt that this was an alternative to
psychiatry because ever since the episodes went down and then disappeared and I
even went off medicine.” (Participant 4)
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In contrast, he added, “mental health workers have paternalistic tendencies… they think they
know it all but, of course, when we get better, we know what is good for us.”
Others reported finding recovery and new ways of understanding their distress
through psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. For Participant 1, working with a Lacanian
psychoanalyst was “useful for creating my own narrative” by “going through the roots of
pain or sadness or trauma… acknowledging them and, to some extent, solving them.” He
explained that going through psychoanalysis “helped to reframe the whole thing and think,
‘okay, this happened to me, it makes sense why I feel like that.’… which is different than
saying, ‘okay, you are just like this.’”
Participant 7 found psychotherapy in combination with other psychosocial supports
helpful for recovery, including psychological support for “dealing with the trauma of my
father’s death,” supported employment to “address the difficulties of poverty,” allowing him
to attend school, and peer-support “where people share experiences, encourage one another...
and when you have difficulties in making decisions, people are able to support you.” The
support in finding work where accommodations were available that would allow them to be
successful was noted as significant by several participants. Participant 3, for example, saw
the “structure and routine” provided by employment, as well as the “working and serving a
purpose,” as “absolutely the most important” and “the most helpful for recovery.”
Similarly, those who identified with a spiritual or religious framework also connected
their recovery with a sense of purpose. Participant 2 described her “Christian spiritual
framework” as a “continued source of resilience” that helped her to “see that recovery is a
process,” and to “put everything in that kind of order, not expecting immediate healing, but
expecting a process and a journey to recovery.” Another common theme was expressed by
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Participant 6, who remarked on how important it was to her recovery to find a framework or
narrative for her experience that connected her to a larger community:
“I was lucky enough that I found myself a narrative and I've found a framework, a
little bit of a framework. I haven't ended up tied to a bed again. I haven't ended up,
you know, going to an emergency room again. I've been very lucky to develop a
strong, strong community… I think, I'm at a different point in my process, in my
journey, and I still have a lot to go through, but I haven't felt the need to search for
another framework and I understand how other people might need that. And I
understand the value of having those frameworks.” (Participant 6)
As participants journeyed through these different frameworks for understanding
themselves and their distress, they also became increasingly involved in efforts to improve
mental health care for others. Participant 3 resolved to get into mental health advocacy after
witnessing abuse during her last involuntary admission:
I was in another hospital, which was really even worse than the ones I had been in
before and there was really terrible abuse. The patients being physically abused,
emotionally abused, all of that. And that is when, for me, it was kind of a decision
and I just decided that this cannot be right. No… There must be something that one
can do. So, I just made a conscious decision and once I was discharged, I decided,
okay, I need to get into the mental health field. I read up a lot. I started volunteering
for mental health organizations.” (Participant 3)
Despite their disempowering experiences in the mental health system, several participants
noted that they were better off than other people in the system who had less privilege and
social power. Participant 6, for example, cited her “mountain of privilege” as one of the
reasons she “felt a responsibility to do something.” The social, educational, and economic
resources available to many of the participants also contributed to their development as
advocates. In their advocacy efforts, participants drew not just on their lived experience, but
their professional networks, training, or creative abilities. They described building upon past
training and careers in graphic design, project management, social work, and education in the
social sciences and law to contribute to mental health reform efforts.
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This activism increasingly revealed the flaws of current mental health systems,
highlighting in particular the dehumanization of service users and lack of attention to the
barriers they faced in society. When Participant 5 began working with a service-user
organization, she noticed that “a service user does not have, usually, the final say in the
treatment plan.” This led her to reflect on her own experiences with her psychiatrist and the
fact that she had “never been given a chance to attend a consultation alone.” Instead, her
family would attend with her and “they did that reporting… I'm there as a passive agent.
People talking about me and not really worried about what I actually feel.” The lack of
agency and autonomy afforded to her prevented her from discussing “personal issues with
how I am treated in the family.” She added, “if I was given a chance, at least once, with my
psychiatrist to discuss how I should handle these issues with my family, that would be a plus
for me, you know, a value added to my treatment options, but it has never happened.” This
realization underscored the need for user-led services and the importance of advocating for
the rights and autonomy of service users. In a similar fashion, Participant 7 began working
with a mental health organization to increase access to services in rural areas. However, he
recalled noting that, despite a lack of access to medications, people in rural areas with the
same diagnoses, “would still wake up, go to work… have a family… join, for example, if it's
a lady, the local women’s club.” This observation in his mental health work led him to begin
to question the assumptions of the mental health system:
“I couldn’t understand why is it that in the rural areas where we didn't have the
Western psychiatric medicines, that people seem to be more a part of their society
than the other people [in the cities] who had access to all these particular services…
And that's actually what really challenged my thinking. I was like, okay, these people,
if you look at the support system in these areas, they are quite useful. These people
are working, they have farms, they are making an income… comparing the two
situations also made me think that, wait a minute, whatever this system is for me, it
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doesn't seem to work very well. There has to be an alternative to addressing mental
health issues and distress within our context.” (Participant 7)
He began to see the biomedical mental health system as “a containment model” that “simply
suppresses the way my emotional distress is being manifested in physical ways... it has
nothing to do with addressing the issues that led to where I am today.” This shift challenged
his thinking about his own treatment, but also led him to look for different types of advocacy
work that went beyond increasing access to medication.
Several participants pointed out that they came to see their initial efforts as mental
health advocates to be limited by the mental health framework and the influence of mental
health experts among leadership. For this reason, all the participants began to organize their
mental health advocacy in conjunction with other peers and people with lived experience.
Participant 2 described her decision to advocate and share her story as a person with lived
experience:
“You have to live with the consequences of what your story is and know the reason
why, one is going to share their story. So, for me, it's to counter stigma. It is to
counter human rights abuses… because I believe there is textbook knowledge on
mental health struggles, textbook knowledge on bipolar disorder, but you, as a person
having lived it, it's totally different and you have a very deep understanding that no
psychiatrist who hasn't lived it or psychologists could have.” (Participant 2)
Early advocacy work for most participants focused on de-stigmatization campaigns, which
often involved sharing their personal stories to highlight the possibility of recovery. As
Participant 1 explained, the advocacy work most often aimed to bring attention to “stigma,
discrimination, lack of employment opportunities, and patient opportunities.”
Encountering the CRPD and Psychosocial Disability
In the search for a more comprehensive framework, and through their engagement in
advocacy, participants became aware of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
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Disability (CRPD) and psychosocial disability framework. In connecting the concept and
term of “psychosocial disability” to the CRPD, people began to also identify themselves as
psychosocially disabled or as persons with psychosocial disabilities. Participant 1 noted that
the identity is “stronger in the Global South,” with “a growing number of people that selfidentify as disabled or as people with psychosocial disabilities.” All the participants on the
African continent referenced changes in their local contexts following the CRPD that initially
signaled the potential the convention held for reforming mental health laws in their countries.
The CRPD led to processes where a country’s mental health laws came under review for
compliance with the convention, creating new opportunities for mental health advocates with
lived experience to champion reforms. Participant 7 explained that, because of the in-country
CRPD review, they “were able to get positions in different government boards working on
disability issues, on social protection, which was really, really important because if you don't
see where decisions are being made, it's very difficult to change laws, systems, policies, and
environmental programs.” Participants in Latin America explained that they became aware of
the convention from other mental health advocates, who offered trainings on the framework
as a strategy for pushing for reforms.
All participants commented on the importance of the CRPD and psychosocial
disability framework for building an explicit connection between human rights and mental
health. Participants added that the CRPD brought new legitimacy to the claims and demands
that mental health activists with lived experience have been making for decades: “the
survivor community has been saying this forever, but at least now there is a recognition from
an international standard that says our positions are just” (Participant 1). For some, reading
the CRPD was bittersweet as they reflected on how its earlier implementation might have
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prevented some of their own more challenging experiences in the mental health system.
Participant 3 remarked:
“I think my first thought was that I wish it was there, in place, years ago from the
beginning. At least I would have had something to fall back on and something to kind
of reference when I was told I do not have any rights.” (Participant 3)
Seeing the potential for this new framework to make transformational changes in their local
contexts and inspired by its recognition of the voices of people with lived experience,
participants increasingly began to organize under the psychosocial disability framework.
Under the Psychosocial Disability Umbrella: (Re)negotiating Identities, Advocacy
Goals, and Tensions
Following their encounter with the CRPD, participants began identifying, at least in
certain contexts, as a person with a psychosocial disability. Several of them explained the
identity as “a sort of umbrella term” for a wide range of people with lived experience. Under
this umbrella, they encountered other people with lived experience who endorsed different
philosophies and principles. The diverse identities and perspectives of different people with
psychosocial disabilities brought to light stark divisions over certain key issues, including:
whether existing mental health frameworks and diagnostic categories can be integrated into
psychosocial disability, whether psychosocial disability contains the concept of an
“impairment” or primarily stems from the societal response to natural diversity, whether
forced treatment should be reduced and mitigated or completely abolished, and whether
conceptions of “madness” can fit within a larger disability framework.
These distinctions impacted how participants prioritized the role of current mental
health treatments in their advocacy. However, they also spoke about several shared principles
among psychosocial disability advocates: calling for full and effective participation in all
aspects of policy, research, and treatment; increasing supports and rights beyond access to
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mental health treatment; attending to cultural factors that shape trauma and distress in local
contexts; and amplifying the voices of underrepresented and marginalized groups. In this
way, participants came to see the psychosocial disability identity as an inclusive term
designed to welcome and unite diverse groups of people with lived experience in the interest
of certain shared goals, particularly in the context of engaging with the movement for global
mental health.
Rethinking Identity as a Rights-Holder
Coming to the psychosocial disability framework through the CRPD catalyzed a
process for participants of renegotiating their own identity and sense of self in relation to the
different philosophies and identities they were encountering. For Participant 1, for instance,
the concept of psychosocial disability “provided a better framework to understand my own
experience… through the journey of understanding where suffering comes from and how you
can deal with it.”
The period of transition between different frameworks and self-understandings was
often experienced as disorienting and conflicting, however. Participant 5 first interpreted her
experiences as a positive spiritual and religious encounter, then came to see it as the result of
a mental disorder, and was now navigating between identifying with a mental health
diagnosis and a psychosocial disability identity. She described the harrowing experience of
moving through these different understandings:
“So, it's very difficult, that period of transition and uncertainty, of not knowing your
words, not knowing who you are really, not knowing whether you are truly worth
living and, you know, finding your point of reference is very difficult. Yeah, very
difficult. When a diagnosis was made and I accepted it, that was a matter of
adjustment… It has never come back to the level of doubting your words, doubting
even your being. So yeah, really stuck between two totally different ways of making
sense of the experience. The spiritual one, in some ways it was comforting to feel like
there was a meaning to the hallucinations and that was hard to give up. Then, on the
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medical side, there was this plan for dealing with it that allowed a return to life and
that was pretty important. But really torn between these different stories about what
was going on.” (Participant 5)
Several participants noted initially feeling uncomfortable with identifying as “disabled,” and
began to wrestle with different understandings of disability. When Participant 4 first
encountered the term psychosocial disability, their first reaction was to ask themselves, “Am
I really disabled?” explaining, “I didn’t see any disability because there wasn’t anything
physical or anything, so I didn’t identify with disability initially.” As he and his fellow
activists went on to attend events held by the UN CRPD committee, however, he began to
understand disability differently, saying, “I realized I also experienced… the discrimination,
the stigmatizing, that people with disabilities faced… so I began to identify this way.” He
came to see the term disability as “even more humanizing… rather than being called a name,
like madman or whatever”:
“It is more human. Because you know, humanity has disabilities, and in the diverse
nature of human beings, people with disabilities are also part of the diversity.
Disability is not inability. Before psychosocial disability, of course, I identified
according to the medical model approach, I was a patient with a major mental illness.
But then, that one also was questionable because the condition comes and goes. I am
not always sick. So, I didn't want to be called a person with a mental illness when I'm
actually functioning normally and I'm not in a crisis. Psychosocial disability was
important. It was positive to know that, actually, you can live with a challenge. It was
the positive change that I felt that other than you referring to me as a patient, a mental
health patient, I do prefer to be called a person with a psychosocial disability.”
(Participant 4)
Another major shift in self-understanding introduced by the concept of psychosocial
disability was a transition toward seeing oneself as a rights-holder, rather than primarily a
“welfare recipient,” or “mental health patient.” Participant 8 connected the process of
“starting to recognize myself as a person with a disability,” to “knowing about this human
rights approach,” becoming “conscious of myself as a subject with rights,” and “starting a
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self-teaching process of formation as an activist.” Similarly, Participant 7 referred to the
transition toward identifying as a person with a psychosocial disability as “quite radical,”
adding that “this is bringing a new framing of human rights within the context of disability
and the whole paradigm shift of recognizing persons with disabilities as rights-holders…
rather than the old paradigm where they were viewed as subjects of charity and welfare.”
The human rights and disability framing shifted how participants made sense of what
could be helpful to them, as well as their priorities for advocacy. Participant 3 began to
identify many of the “external factors that are causing disability,” above and beyond the
impact of her symptoms alone. She recalled being dismissed from work and being told “you
will never be able to work again… never be able to live on my own, drive a car… that I
always need to be accompanied… that I can’t manage my own finances,” and she now
challenged this “paternalistic approach.” Participant 8 explained that he began to look around
at himself and other mental health patients and “saw that their situation wasn't a lot different
than mine. We all faced barriers, limitations, and our families were our basic support in our
spaces for coexistence.” He added, “when I knew about this human rights approach, I finally
had arguments to understand my situation of life.” The new understandings facilitated by
“switching away from the medical model,” toward the psychosocial disability framework, led
Participant 1 to think about his recovery less in terms of “a deficit that needed to be fixed
with medication or treatment, but more like there was a lack of support that could be added
that would allow me to function and feel the way that I wanted to function and feel.”
Strategic Positioning and the Paradigm Shift
In advocacy work, the psychosocial disability framework also led to a change in focus
from repairing individual deficits to adding social supports. Several participants highlighted
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that the decision to identify as a person with a psychosocial disability has a strategic element.
Even as “psychosocial disability is, above all, a legal category” (Participant 1), “choosing
that identity is like a political statement” (Participant 7). While the extent of one’s personal
connection to the psychosocial disability identity varied among participants, all recognized
its strategic potential for addressing broader barriers to health and full participation in
community life. Participant 1 saw it as “a framing tool in terms of this sense of the social
construct” that allows us “to better understand the challenges people face,” and leads to
“broader thinking in terms of policies.” He added, “this was a very useful tool to take down
and try to achieve some change.” Participant 6 also referred to psychosocial disability as “a
tool to guarantee human rights… develop alternatives... and promote autonomy” that activists
are using to “try to promote a movement in Latin America that uses the convention.”
Participant 7 emphasized how this change in perspective meant going beyond mental health
treatment alone:
“It's about moving from a narrative of providing mental health services but looking
broadly at the narrative around inclusion… it's not just about mental health. What we
have to realize is this debate is about inclusion of persons with psychosocial
disability… it's about employment. It's about social protection… it's about access to
all government services on an equal basis with others. It was sort of a change in
strategy, in terms of embracing the new framework.” (Participant 7)
The psychosocial disability framework was understood as providing an advantage in
advocacy efforts because of the connection to human rights and legal protections; it came
with an emphasis on inclusion that was not always recognized within other forms of mental
health advocacy. For instance, Participant 4 noted a difference in how he was treated when
he was seen as a “mental patient”:
“Psychosocial disability has helped me in that, of course, when we are being called
mental patients, we have no rights to really under guardianship laws. They were so
corrupt and there was no issue of the decision-making, but now with the psychosocial
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disability, even in our countries, they have to be protected by the disability act, using
the CRPD. So as this group, at least we can be listened to--other than as a patient,
when they have no time for you. So, I felt more human than in the medical model
approach.” (Participant 4)
The newfound connection to the disability movement “re-framed a little bit of the
conversation,” and created the impetus within the government to seek representation for
people with psychosocial disabilities. Participant 3 was surprised that she was invited to join
a governmental committee on disability and asked to represent people with psychosocial
disabilities specifically. Once on the disability working group, she found she was able to use
the CRPD as a standard for “advising the government on the implementation and
domestication of the CRPD” with local laws. Unfortunately, inclusion did not immediately
produce results. As she noted, “doing stuff for government is very frustrating because as
much as you talk and advise and work, you don’t often see any change happening.”
Participant 2 similarly noted that “there is no perfection in any legal framework” and that
“there is a lot of work to do” to reach the CRPD standards globally. Yet she saw the
emergence of the psychosocial disability framework as “very liberating.” She explained:
“I found it to be a challenge in the way we do things in my country. So, I found it to
be a gateway for freedom for those living with psychosocial disabilities here. And,
knowing that they're not only unwell, but they're also human beings who have rights
and only need access to these rights. So, I was blown away by the discussions around
the CRPD.” (Participant 2)
This quote also points to a common characterization of the paradigm shift marked by the
transition to a psychosocial disability framework: from increasing access to mental health
treatment, to guaranteeing access to human rights. Participant 7 referred to this as “a very
radical shift” which now asked questions like, “what are the social determinants of mental
health and… how do you address that also?” Participant 1 explained that the movement of a
“growing number of people that self-identify as people with psychosocial disabilities” brings
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with it “a strong framework of the social construction of disability… with the whole package
of inclusion, [and] participation, where health is just one aspect of a set of rights, one aspect,
one dimension of people's life.” Participant 8 also noted the new types of questions being
asked:
“In the movement of people with psychosocial disability, at an international level, the
matter of a universal basic income is being discussed, and maybe a psychiatrist or a
person who agrees with the bio-medical discourse, would say ‘what does universal
basic income have to do with mental health?’” (Participant 8)
In line with this shift, participants began to focus their advocacy work on programs that
addressed access to employment opportunities, economic empowerment programs, and the
integration of people with psychosocial disabilities into existing social and cultural programs
and resources.
This shift not only broadened the discussion beyond mental health services, but also
led participants to reimagine what types of mental health services could be offered that
respected the rights and autonomy of people with psychosocial disabilities. Participant 6, for
instance, discussed a new initiative to design “some kind of respite place for people that are
experiencing non-ordinary states.” For her, the principal of self-management goes beyond
treatment decisions and informed consent, to also contribute to practices like cooperativism
and mutual aid where people support one another within communal and non-hierarchical
organizations. As she explained: “Let's get together, you know, all of us ‘Mad,’ and we can
work together to provide for our needs and we're going to decide how much we work based
on how much we need for the type of life that we want to live.”
Uneasy Alliances under the Psychosocial Disability Umbrella
Working under the umbrella of psychosocial disability, participants noted how
different personal histories with mental health treatment, as well as different political and
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cultural realities, led to different identities, philosophies, and priorities among people with
lived experience. Participants explained that the different groups of mental health advocates
they had identified with previously, or concurrently along with psychosocial disability, were
largely the result of their contexts and personal histories. Among these other lived-experience
identities were service-user, Mad, consumer, psychiatric survivor, voice-hearer, and person
with a mental health condition.
Several participants noted how the accessibility, social power, and stigma of
psychiatry in their local contexts impacted their own experiences and, in turn, the ways they
chose to identify. For example, Participant 5 explained that, in her view, the “psychiatric
survivor” identity was more common in the Global North because in LMICs many people do
not have access to any psychiatric services or medications. Participants also noted that the
psychiatric survivor framing continues to center psychiatry in the discussion which, even if it
is engaged in an adversarial way, can keep the conversation stuck in debates over psychiatric
treatments and, thus, within a biomedical model. However, multiple participants went on to
note that the lack of resources for mental healthcare in their countries allowed them to “walk
away from services” and guessed that they might have been held against their will in the
Global North. For example, Participant 6 noted: “The country that I live in played no small
part in the reason that I've been able to get out of what sometimes can be perceived as the
prison of the mental health system.”
Cultural differences in stigma and how the rights of the individual are prioritized
against the rights of families or communities were also discussed. For participants in
countries where experiences like hallucinations and delusions are commonly associated with
demonic possession or witchcraft, they sometimes found it useful to invoke the Western
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medical language of psychiatric diagnoses to reduce stigma and fear in communities. In one
example, Participant 5 stated that the language of diagnosis was less stigmatizing than
psychosocial disability because the word used to mean disability in the local language “is
loaded with so much stigma and discrimination”:
“It doesn't have the lighter understanding and sense that you understand as an English
speaker. Someone with psychosocial disability is translated in the local language as
someone who is almost non-functional… language matters.” (Participant 5)
When it came to negotiating the rights of the individual vs. the collective, participants noted
that advocates in the Global North often failed to appreciate the primacy of family and
communal life in many other cultures. Coming from a country “where you have very scarce
services,” Participant 5 explained that she found it a privilege to be able to be diagnosed as
bipolar and access medications. For this reason, she stated, “I never felt myself as a
psychiatric survivor, not that psychiatry has no flaws, no issues, but… for me, [service-user]
emphasizes more of the active agency, way more than the mistreatments.” She then added:
“Maybe in the Western world, you have a very individual culture, right? You advance
concepts of rights that you think that you have and that you are being deprived of
when you are involuntary admitted, et cetera. But for me, I am really grateful for my
parents and my family for involuntary admitting me because I would have lost so, so
many things.” (Participant 5)
Participant 5 also noted that “families are the natural form of support,” and that when in
periods of distress, “most likely it is my family that will take responsibility for that.” These
quotes highlight how lived-experience advocacy groups that prioritize the right to refuse
medication and to make individual decisions over treatments did not resonate with
participants from the Global South where few people have access to medications, psychiatric
institutions have less power to institutionalize people, and where familial and communal
decision-making practices are more widely accepted.
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Participant 5’s reference to involuntary treatment also alludes to the disagreements
over certain principles, definitions, and priorities between different subgroups of people with
lived experience who now identify as people with psychosocial disabilities. All participants
discussed how, through engaging in advocacy work under the psychosocial disability
umbrella, they encountered a more diverse group of people with lived experience and, as a
result, became increasingly aware of different perspectives and disagreements. As Participant
7 put it, “the issue of identity peels over into issues of ideology and the way you perceive
things and the kind of standards you want to uphold.”
Impairment, Diagnosis, and Disability. On the broadest level, there was
disagreement over whether psychosocial disability could integrate parts of a biomedical
mental health approach or whether psychosocial disability constituted a clear break with this
approach, and was therefore incompatible with notions of psychiatric diagnosis. Participant 1
explained that some psychosocial disability advocates had come into the movement with
opposing goals:
“From my experience, you have different ways that people came into advocacy. Some
people from a perspective of a service user and basically demanding sometimes just
access and more often better quality of services, but still in the belief that mental
health services are important and should be available and should be accessible…
framed strongly in the right to health framework. Then you have a survivor
community that has been harmed by the system and by psychiatry that normally has a
stronger stance... some of them actually have a perspective that psychiatry has no role
and that mental health services produce more harm than good. So, you can see that
there is a completely different position for those advocating for mental health services
and those that are advocating actually for reparations to the victims of mental health
services.” (Participant 1)
Indeed, each of the participants located themselves somewhere on the spectrum between
those with integrationist perspectives on the biomedical model of mental health, who want to
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increase access to services globally, and those on the more radical end who focus instead on
building alternatives to psychiatry.
The question of whether the psychosocial disability framework should integrate what
was alternatively referred to as psychiatric discourse, mental health frameworks, and the
biomedical model is most apparent in the debates over “impairment.” Within the social
model of disability, any disability is understood to arise from social barriers and the lack of
accommodation of the physical difference, or impairment, of the disabled person. However,
the participants pointed out that disagreements remain over how to describe and
conceptualize what it is about the person that is not being accommodated within their
environment, thus causing the disability.
Those who saw their own diagnosis as accurate and helpful integrated the biomedical
model by equating the psychiatric diagnosis with impairment. For these participants,
diagnoses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder referred to universal underlying
medical conditions and then disability arose because of social stigma, discrimination, and a
lack of support for people with these conditions. For example, on the issue of impairment,
Participant 5 drew an equivalence between psychiatric diagnosis and physical disabilities,
going so far as to say that she preferred the term “mental illness” to “mental disorder.” She
added:
“Because when you say disorder, you have an order... and you have something not
going as ordered. It has some negative connotation for me. But when you say illness,
it has some parity with even a physical illness… I prefer to describe myself as
someone with bipolar disorder… It's part of my personality, you know. It's who I am.
It explains my mood swings. It explains my actions, my emotions.” (Participant 5)
Participant 2 said that some psychiatric diagnoses might vary by context, giving the example
of different sexual orientations being seen as disorders in her country but not in the West.
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Other disorders, however, such as depression and bipolar disorder, she saw as appearing the
same everywhere, “irrespective of the place of treatment.” She explained that because “the
science is universal,” certain psychiatric diagnoses could be understood to be “part of human
nature.” When considering the link between psychiatric disorders and disability, Participant 3
also made the comparison to physical illnesses. She explained:
“For me… the existing condition is still there. And is it impacting on my mental
health. So, when you look at external factors, what society causes, it just makes it
much more difficult to manage. They're seeing me as different. I think I know a lot of
people don't like to compare it to physical illnesses, but, if I have a headache, you
know, nobody's discriminating against me or anything like that. But if you say you
have a mental health condition, all of the sudden, it's a completely different thing and
it shouldn't be.” (Participant 3)
However, she accepted that social factors do not just factor into disability in response to an
underlying condition, as these social determinants can also be one of the causes of mental
health conditions in the first place. In her words, “mental health is so complex because there's
so many factors… whether it's inherited disease in your family, a mental health condition can
be caused by trauma or stress. There's just so many causes. I can't really say that there's
particularly one thing that causes those things. So, for me, it's a combination.” Despite all the
various causes she saw for mental health conditions, she felt that “even within psychosocial
disability,” it is still important to “link the mental health conditions to it” and “add that
component of that medical side to it.”
For these individuals, the analogies to medicine and physical disability were both
seen as useful for efforts to reduce stigma and discrimination. Participant 2 argued that a
“transformation at the community level happens when you simplify psychosocial disability”:
“Everybody's like, ‘Oh, okay. So, it is actually a disability. This is not something that you
brought upon yourself or some flawed thing that you've done… It's a sickness that has come
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upon you, it's an illness and one needs care like anybody else.’” When doing outreach work
on psychosocial disabilities, she liked to use the example of a broken arm, saying “the same
way that when you wound your arm, you need support to heal, the same way the mind needs
support to heal.” This comparison alludes to the possibility of recovery, breaking with other
comparisons to medical illnesses that imply chronicity and the need for medication
management, such as in the common “like insulin for diabetes” idiom for depression. The
possibility of recovery was also discussed by Participant 4. He defined people with
psychosocial disabilities as “people who have had chronic episodes with mental health
challenges that reduced their capacity to function on an equal basis with others,” adding, “the
condition comes with barriers that will not enable you to function and that is where disability
comes in.” However, he explained that the “mental health challenges” implicated in
impairment were likely to come and go or change over time: “If you call me a person with
schizophrenia, it doesn’t mean I’m always schizophrenic… that diagnosis is not permanent…
maybe I come out of it and then have depression or bipolar… but you can change so I don’t
see why labels should be there.” He compared this to a person with a psychosocial disability
who, even when “they have recovered, they can still identify in that way because they have
faced discrimination in the past, lost jobs, and had long term impairments that changed their
life.”
In contrast, participants who were critical of the biomedical model experienced
psychiatric diagnoses and comparisons with illnesses as limiting and stigmatizing in
themselves. For Participant 6, for instance, “the biomedical narrative… it’s damaging to
people,” and those who use that narrative, “they talk about stigma, stigma here, stigma there,
but they don’t see that the stigma starts with the labeling and the mainstream narrative.” A
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recurrent theme that came up with these participants was that integrating much of the
language and concepts of the mental health framework would undermine the potential of the
psychosocial disability movement to push for supports beyond access to medication and
therapy. Participant 7, for example, argued that when advocates attempt to bring the
biomedical framework into the conceptualization of psychosocial disability, they risk
translating social issues into mental health issues. He gave the example of gender-based
violence, saying “if someone is in an abusive relationship, there’s no medicine that’s going to
fix that… we really have to address gender-based violence.” By treating the effects of this
abuse as a mental health issue advocates can inadvertently collude with the “families, people
in communities, and local administrators that want to cover these issues up.” The advocates
who focus on a mental health framework get it backwards, he argued:
“The narrative for them is like, ‘if you want to fix education, you have to fix mental
health. If you have to fix up issues about employment, you have to fix mental health.’
But for me, it's not like that…. The whole issue of me being able to be in an
employment space more or less has nothing to do with my mental health. It's about
creating accommodations and support systems within the workplace.” (Participant 7)
This concern is connected to the issue of impairment because if impairment is defined
narrowly and in biomedical terms, it tends to lead to an exclusive focus on medication access
and adherence. In response to this issue, participants suggested defining impairment broadly,
in terms of some difference or diversity that leads to marginalization in society and then, as a
result of these social barriers, leads to disability. Participant 1 explained:
“I think when joining medical framework, that's what you hear every single day…
repeated by doctors, families, and everything. You need to keep your treatment, you
cannot abandon treatment… without that realization that maybe we are more complex
persons and that we have these different needs. So, this is also about embracing, I
would say, diversity. I think for me, that's an important concept: the diversity of
emotions and embracing the diversity.” (Participant 1)
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Because some lived experience groups do not identify as disabled, seeing this as tantamount
to an admission of impairment, some advocates have suggested that psychosocial diversity
might make a better umbrella term. However, Participant 1 also noted that without a stronger
definition of difference, diversity, or impairment, the psychosocial disability identity
becomes conceptually dependent on the existence of social barriers.
“Which other groups define themselves in terms of social barriers? Which is weird,
because… if society is inclusive and accessible, do you lose your identity? … my
point is that maybe we need to focus again on the diversity aspect of it… We should
embrace it and understand that there are social barriers and we need to take them
down and discrimination, but I wouldn't like to be a person without disability.”
(Participant 1)
For this reason, he preferred the term “madness” to impairment and suggested that theorizing
impairment in terms of “madness” would lead to more radical social change for psychosocial
disability advocates than integrating biomedical conceptualizations and diagnoses from
psychiatry. Similarly, other participants suggested that impairment can be better
conceptualized by new terms that do not carry the baggage of medical discourse. For
instance, one person advocated for terms like “sentipensantes” (feel-thinkers), which better
captures how those deemed “mad” connect “the rational and emotional,” as well as
“psicodisidentes” (psychodissidents) “because we as activists assure the idea of madness as
part of our identity, and as part of political discourse, we are dissidents of every social
norm.”
Without bringing in the biomedical explanation for etiology, these advocates left open
the question of where difference, impairment, diversity, or madness originates from in the
first place. Participants acknowledged that this was a politically fraught question, with
myriad contrasting opinions among people with lived experience internationally. For this
reason, several participants stated that sometimes it is best not to address questions of
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causation openly. Participant 1 stated that “we don’t really go too much into that,” especially,
“because rights shouldn’t be dependent on that and, anyway, the convention protects people
no matter how they perceive impairments.” Participant 8 worried that giving too much
attention to the causes of impairment would be strategically unwise for psychosocial
disability advocates because these theories have historically been used to “justify inhumane
treatment,” saying “it’s best for advocates to avoid theory about madness or impairment and
where it comes from.”
Coercion, Forced Treatment, and Institutionalization. All participants referred to
ongoing tensions over coercion and forced treatment in mental health settings, emphasizing
that the largest gap on this issue was between advocates supporting the CRPD and
organizations representing psychiatrists internationally. Participant 7 explained that the
transition to a rights-based approach to mental health, which had been inspired by the CRPD,
has been held up, largely, due to “resistance from medical professionals” and “organizations
of psychiatrists.” Similarly, Participant 8 noted that “there is a lot of influence from
psychiatry against recognizing the full rights of people with psychosocial disabilities,”
because of “the idea of a lack of mental capacity, the incapability to express our own will,”
which, he added, is “something that doesn’t happen with physical disabilities or sensory
disabilities.” All of the participants acknowledged that it was their goal to reduce forced
treatment, and increase shared decision-making and informed consent practices. They noted
disagreement, however, on how to go about achieving this and on whether forced treatment
should be completely abolished. In putting forward their positions on this topic, several
participants spoke with hesitancy, acknowledging the complexity and the weight of the issue
and reflecting on their own experiences with coercive practices.
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The majority of participants (5/8) described having experienced coercion in a mental
health setting, including being chained to a tree, placed in physical restraints, forcible
injection of sedating medications, coercive treatment, threats from hospital staff, ECT
without informed consent, being held in a medical facility against their will, and long-term or
chronic institutionalization. All three of the remaining participants detailed witnessing
coercive treatment in their advocacy or mental health work and spoke about being shaped by
what they saw. Participant 1, who in his advocacy work has visited psychiatric facilities
internationally for 15 years, noted how widespread and common coercive practices are
worldwide:
“You would see people deprived of their liberty for a long time, neglect, a lot of
situations that you will consider torture… absolute lack of support… people in
secluded rooms for years, people tied to their bed… around the world it’s the same.”
(Participant 1)
Another participant (ID number omitted here to further protect anonymity) shared her own
story with forced treatment, coercion, and institutionalization. She disclosed that the first
time she was involuntarily admitted, she was explicitly told she no longer had any rights.
“I was directly told I have no rights. I have no human rights. I'm the property of the
president. I'll never forget it. My signature means absolutely nothing. So that really
kind of bulldozed me... I was already struggling, already felt worthless because of the
stigma attached, and fear about how people are gonna treat me because of my mental
health condition. I go to a place that's supposed to provide me safety and care and
now it further strips me away of who I am, my person. So, for me, I didn't even know
at the time that I could put up a fight. They couldn't do it to me today. But back then,
I didn't know. I wasn't aware that I had rights. I just believed them. I think that
impacted on my recovery. Absolutely. Because, I mean, if you feel worthless, you're
not going to fight or try to better your life or anything. I just gave up really.”
Once involuntarily admitted, she was transferred to a “lockup ward” where she was told she
would be held indefinitely. She was stripped of her clothes and her possessions, taken to a
dormitory with 40 other women, threatened by a nurse and then forcibly medicated. She
78

recalled waking up to the sound of the keys unlocking the doors in the morning. “You're
locked in the dormitory at night,” she explained. “So, in the morning, they unlock you, it's
from door to door they lock and unlock you. I still struggle to deal with the sound of keys. It's
like the prison keys.” After being lined up naked in a queue to be bathed, she was then locked
in the breakfast room, “then for the rest of the day, they lock you in a huge room, but it's only
concrete floors.” Heavily sedated by medication, she and many of the other patients slept on
the concrete floors throughout the day. She summed up the experience:
“I think it was probably a more traumatic experience than the symptoms I
experienced from my diagnosis… I still have flashbacks. I'm often triggered by
specific sounds and tastes, you know, from a moment I had in there… the feeling of
the cold floor, the keys. To this day, I will not close, I can't close, a door. It just freaks
me out…. It's all those things and it's like what 20 odd years ago. It's still with me.”
These personal encounters with forced treatment and coercion informed the advocacy goals
and positions of participants. Despite her own traumatic experience, the participant above
did not take an abolitionist position against all forms of coercion in all situations. Instead, she
suggested the coercion should be reserved only for crisis situations where a person poses an
imminent danger to themselves or others, should be as brief as possible, and that once in
treatment, rights should be respected and protected. She warned that if forced treatment were
abolished immediately, it would lead to people in crisis being criminalized and sent to prison
where they would be less likely to be protected by the CRPD.
Another participant stated that she was grateful to have been forcibly medicated
against her will during what she described as a manic episode, despite how painful this was
for her:
“During the manic episodes, I have done so many exuberant things that I am always
ashamed of afterwards. So, if my parents weren't there to tie me, to chain me in, to
take me to the hospital, to be treated there, things would have escalated, and I even
wouldn't be alive today. That's how I understand it. I'm very grateful for my parents
79

to cross the line, the border of individual rights, liberty, et cetera, for my best
interests.”
She added, however, that “to be treated forcefully is painful,” adding:
“I know because I have some fresh memories in my mind where people are tying me,
strong young men, with muscle, pulling me, my hands behind, so that the nurse could
inject some calming medication, et cetera. That memory is still fresh in my mind, and
I don't like it. I don't like it, but retrospectively, if that hadn't happened, the sequence
would be much worse.”
Because of her own experience, she explained, she does not take a bold stance against all
involuntary hospitalizations in her advocacy. But even in these circumstances she “condemns
treating the service-user with disrespect,” which, she added, is “very common but not at all
fair.” She then raised the issue of legal capacity, asking “to what extent can we leave it to the
individual to exercise his or her right, even when many others feel they may lack the ability
to make an informed decision at that moment?”
The question of legal capacity came to the fore for other participants who saw this
issue as having consequences that ripple throughout society, far beyond the walls of mental
health institutions. For instance, Participant 8 stated that the idea of “lacking legal capacity”
goes well beyond crisis situations and ends up justifying coercive practices throughout the
mental health system:
“In psychiatric discourse, psychosocial disabilities are associated with the idea of a
lack of mental capacity, the incapability to express their own will, the difficulty to
recognize oneself as a subject that interacts with society… Because of this, people
with psychosocial disabilities are submitted to treatments against our will, involuntary
interventions are imposed on us that in some cases can be irreversible, such as
sterilizations, electro-convulsive therapies, a series of practices that in other kinds of
individuals could be seen as unacceptable, but, the psychiatric discourse has made
society consent to the imposition of these treatments on people that are seen as
‘mentally ill,’ this also validates the existence of ‘madhouses,’ as well as the
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existence of the presence of a powerful pharmacological model in our day-to-day
life.” (Participant 8)
Similarly, Participant 7 saw the question of legal capacity as “leading to rampant human
rights violations,” and “reinforcing stigma,” which “entreaties deep discrimination.” He gave
the example of criminal and legal codes in his country that prevent people with psychosocial
disabilities from entering contracts or even getting married. In another example, one
participant noted that in her immigration documents to gain citizenship in a high-income
country she had to answer the question, “Have you ever been in a psychiatric institution or
legally incapacitated?”
“It was under the moral character chapter. Like before they were asking me if I had
supported terrorist organizations and later if I had been convicted of any child
trafficking and then, in the middle, you have this.”
On the issue of legal capacity and forced treatment, Participant 5 underlined the necessity to
come up with solutions that balance conceptualizations of “individual freedom,” which she
associated with the West, against “the best interest of the person,” as determined by the
family and the community, which she stated was the most common consideration in her
country. “You have two extremes that are not working for the service users,” she added. “So,
there should be some middle ground to that.”
Participants saw room for such a middle ground on the major issues dividing people
with psychosocial disabilities. In doing so, they often acknowledged that other advocates had
come to their beliefs honestly, through difficult situations, and recognized that debate over
these issues was not just abstract, but personal. Participant 2, who identified as a service-user
and a person with bipolar disorder, as well as a person with a psychosocial disability, agreed
that “people who have had good treatment are usually maybe more okay with using mental
health language and people who have had bad experiences with treatment, like psychiatric
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survivors, feel that their treatment was something they had to escape from.” However, she
saw their experiences of bad treatment not as a result of the biomedical model but potentially
resulting from a lack of access to “early diagnosis, good diagnosis, and good treatment.”
Conversely, Participant 8 advocated for moving away from psychiatric discourse, but spoke
about how challenging this discourse can feel like an “attack” to other service-users that
leads to infighting rather than the desired social change:
“It is a complex process because… psychiatric discourse has such power that there
are no alternatives that are allowed to people who are in a lot of distress, with a lot of
mental pain, that are socially excluded. This makes it so that a lot of people who are
users of mental health services normalize all that discourse, and when you question
those approaches, they feel attacked. They feel like suddenly their world collapses
and instead of starting a process of analysis and self-recognition, positioning
themselves inside that discourse and recognizing themselves as a subject of rights, in
a lot of cases they question us, those who are questioning that model, that approach
and evidence.” (Participant 8)
Due to the personal nature of these issues and the resultant strong positions taken by various
advocates, participants argued for a form of pluralism, recognizing that, as Participant 6 put
it, “if we try to impose our views on each other, we are recreating the problem ourselves of
oppressive power dynamics and hierarchies.” Instead, she resolved: “my view is my own and
everybody has a right to their view… and we need a respectful place to accomplish our
shared goals.”
Solidarity and Shared Goals Among Psychosocial Disability Advocates
Even as the heterogeneity of perspectives under the psychosocial disability umbrella
posed challenges for advocates, participants emphasized the benefits of uniting people with
lived experience within a human rights framework. Participant 3 also highlighted the
importance of respecting a diversity of viewpoints among advocates:
“Thinking about the different groups in the user, survivor, psychosocial disability
movement, and the different sort of philosophies about mental health that are there; If
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there was more acknowledgement and less infighting, it would help to make more
policy influence on a larger scale. It's likely you cannot force people to kind of
believe what you believe. It also comes back for me to respect and appreciation for
diversity.” (Participant 3)
In this regard, participants underlined several key principles and advocacy goals that were
shared among most people with psychosocial disabilities. First, participants agreed to a broad
definition of psychosocial disability built on the social model, as long as it avoids specifics
about the issue of impairment. Participant 8 summarized the widely agreed upon
conceptualization this way:
“According to the social and human rights model about disability, we can say that
disability is a situation. In this situation, there is a person with a functional condition
that puts them in a minority, and they have faced discrimination and barriers as a
result. This is also valid in physical disability, in sensory disabilities, in intellectual
disability. From the social and human rights model, the disability becomes a legal
category, a person or user of mental health services is at risk of being discriminated
against because of a condition or disability because they are seen as different.”
(Participant 8)
Within the framing, participants agreed that “there is so much to gain” by adopting this
framework and connecting with the broader disability movement, especially, as Participant 7
put it, “in terms of transforming and then ensuring the full and effective participation and
inclusion of persons with psychosocial disability.” Connecting with the disability movement
creates opportunities for people with lived experience to have a greater influence on research
and policy surrounding mental health, but it also means influence on (and access to) broader
social programs. For example, participants became involved in economic empowerment
programs, education support programs, and departments on youth welfare, to name a few. As
Participant 7 explained, the psychosocial disability framework “creates structures that will
enable the empowerment and the full and effective participation and inclusion of persons
with psychosocial disabilities on an equal basis with others in all facets of this country.”
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The emphasis on particular interactions between the individual and social barriers in
the construction of psychosocial disability facilitates a shift away from a “one-size-fits-all
approach” to addressing mental distress. Participants envisioned a system where people in
distress could choose from a menu of supports that would help them return to life. Instead of
presenting with distress in a medical setting and entering immediately into mental health care
to be prescribed medication or inpatient or outpatient treatment, there would first be an
attempt “to find maybe other causes of what kind of triggered a mental health problem and
first trying to resolve those issues” (Participant 3). Then, people might be empowered to
embark “on a more personal journey in terms of how different people feel and what does
support mean to them,” which in the short term could mean, as Participant 1 stated, help with
“communication, supported decision making, peer support, normally some mix of all of this,
understanding that you may not feel well and you may need help from friends and peers.”
Even participants who were critical of the biomedical approach or chose not to take
medication themselves went out of their way to emphasize that they are not anti-medication,
and that they support others who may choose medication in the short or long term. For
example, Participant 3 stated that she believes she will need life-long medication to manage
her psychosis symptoms for herself, and wanted to make sure these drugs were available to
others who currently did not have access. “What I don’t agree with,” she added, “is a
psychiatrist or doctors going too easily to diagnose or too easily just to prescribe
medication… when you never even looked behind the psychosis… what are the reasons for
me?... what kind of triggered my mental health problem and first trying to resolve those
issues.” Participant 8, who conversely refused medication for his own symptoms of mania,
outlined a similar perspective.
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“Something fundamental is that, in the end, there's certain accord that we as activists
don't question when others decide to take a pharmacological treatment, or even in a
situation of crisis if they choose to be under supervision in internment, The problem
is that the people don't get information, that there are no alternatives, that they
imposed the decision, that their rights don't get respected. In an ideal state, maybe
psychiatry would be an option in a spectrum of alternatives, and not as it happens
now that it is the only option available or even is imposed on a person who is living a
critical psychosocial situation.” (Participant 8)
Participants also highlighted how the available supports “in a spectrum of alternatives” can
and should vary by cultural context, including local community and religious organizations
and traditional healers. Participant 7 explained how traditional healers can play a key role in
addressing issues in their country. As trauma and distress can often arise due to
circumstances within a family or community, traditional healers who are more closely tied
into these networks can often identify and address the underlying conflicts in a way that
mental health professionals cannot:
“If you got to a traditional healer... she would ask them about… family problems,
relationship problems... and that for us was a different way of addressing people’s
distress and trauma.” (Participant 7)
Participants also stated that, depending on circumstances and local context, people with lived
experience might choose not to identify as a person with a psychosocial disability. Because
of the way the psychosocial disability framework has been broadly defined, advocates saw
their work as “raising up the voices of other marginalized groups” and “putting in play this
legal mechanism to fight this discrimination.” “It has to be a process of coexistence,”
Participant 8 said, “a slow process in which we accompany each other and recognize
ourselves as a collective, a collective that faces the same barriers independently of the
ideology of each member.”
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Walking the Tightrope in a Tug of War: Global Mental Health, Barriers to Inclusion,
and Transformative Potential
The final super-ordinate theme emerged from participants’ descriptions of their
reflections on the Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH) and their experiences
engaging with leaders of the movement. These included becoming involved in MGMH
research initiatives in their local contexts, and navigating the relationship between MGMHaffiliated organizations and psychosocial disability advocacy groups of which they were a
part. One participant described an ongoing “tug of war” between leaders of the MGMH and
their critics, while another felt that they were “walking a tightrope” back and forth between
“totally different ways of seeing.”
All participants identified issues with the MGMH on conceptual and practical
grounds, and discussed how divisions within the larger psychosocial disability community
impacted their advocacy efforts. As psychosocial disability advocates, several participants
faced a difficult decision between engaging in a “tokenized” role while attempting to push
for reforms and CRPD compliance, or refusing to engage out of principle and risking the
implementation of oppressive policies without their input. Participants outlined necessary
guidelines and best practices to create the conditions necessary for the full and effective
participation of people with psychosocial disabilities in the MGMH. If these conditions could
be met, they were optimistic about ending traumatic practices and transforming the MGMH
toward a rights-based paradigm. In addition, participants saw the psychosocial disability
framework as having the potential not just to create solidarity “under the umbrella” between
different lived experience groups, but also to facilitate new partnerships and alliances with
other disability and human rights organizations. These collaborations can be leveraged to put
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financial, legal, and political pressure on MGMH projects for full inclusion. Their hope was
that a full integration of the psychosocial disability framework into the MGMH efforts could
create a paradigm shift away from scaling up the biomedical model and toward implementing
rights-based policies, research, and interventions.
Power Imbalances in the Movement for Global Mental Health
Participants stressed the many barriers that people with psychosocial disabilities face
to full inclusion and participation in the MGMH, including a lack of reasonable
accommodations and power imbalances between “experts” and “experts by experience.” To
highlight the type of expertise that comes with lived experience, Participant 5 drew on
consumer metaphors, saying: “if you want to know how comfortable a bed is, you don't ask
the manufacturer, you don't ask the retailer, you ask the one who sleeps on it on daily basis.
He knows where it hurts. He knows where it needs some work to make it more comfortable.”
Acknowledging that the expertise users have about their own experiences extends beyond
their experience of services, the consumer metaphor is nonetheless illustrative and ironic. It
draws attention to the perception among participants that the MGMH was entangled with the
commercial interests of psychiatric and pharmaceutical institutions that viewed them less as
sources of essential knowledge, and more as unwitting customers of a product.
For instance, when participants pushed for compliance with the CRPD in their
advocacy work, they found that this framework, while supported by disability and human
rights groups, was often actively opposed by powerful psychiatric organizations and
pharmaceutical interests. Participant 7 relayed that “there was a lot of tension between mental
health professionals that were not willing to adopt the paradigm shift.” A few participants
noted the explicit statements put out by organizations of psychiatrists that contested the
87

human rights and psychosocial disability framework, particularly with regards to the
prohibition of forced treatment and the recognition of legal capacity. The resistance of the
psychiatric community presented a major barrier to the reform efforts being championed by
psychosocial disability advocates due to the outsized influence psychiatric and
pharmaceutical groups had on governments:
“You really have to recognize that psychiatry has a huge influence and especially
working closely with pharmaceutical industry… that's a huge, huge problem because
they will come in, you know, influence a lot of things because they have money, they
have networks, they can lobby, they can see the government anytime they want.
Unlike me, who it might take a lot of time before I see even a junior staff member...
So, we also have to look at the power that psychiatry has with a lot of backing from
pharmaceutical companies to do their work, of course, in the global south.”
(Participant 7)
Participants also described encountering this power differential with psychiatrists,
psychologists, and other mental health professionals in interpersonal situations where there
was meant to be equal collaboration. Participant 2 noted that, “there is always some tensions
there,” because “psychiatrists feel like they have certain abilities and are above the users.”
Participant 8 relayed a story where he was invited to speak about his recovery by a
psychiatrist at an institution where he was previously held. When he explained that he no
longer identified with his diagnosis and would instead present on how he came to understand
himself as a person with a psychosocial disability, he found that the psychiatrist was
unfamiliar with the CRPD. After sending him a copy of the CRPD, the psychiatrist replied
that he “wouldn’t trust any book without a bibliography.” “Obviously, I told him that we
were talking about an international tractate about human rights. The Constitution doesn't
have a bibliography at the end for consultation.” In this way, he felt that the psychiatrist was
attempting to frame their disagreement in terms of “psychiatric science” versus “values and
beliefs.”
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The power dynamics between “experts” and “experts by experience” were
exacerbated by, and entangled with, the historical and ongoing exploitation of the Global
South by the Global North. As psychosocial disability advocates in the Global South, the
participants recognized that the priorities, methods, and leadership of the MGMH stemmed
from the Global North. Participants observed that many of the MGMH projects in their
locales were based out of the U.S. and UK, did not actively involve local experts or
communities, and that their financial resources only “trickled down” to local organizations.
For example, Participant 7 explained that his organization “has withdrawn from some of the
projects because of that issue,” saying, “you can’t be telling us to implement your projects
here in [African country] when most of the resources and manpower is based in London or
New York or whatever.” For many participants, this arrangement was reminiscent of their
country’s history with colonialism. Participant 6 explicitly referred to the MGMH as “the
grandchild of the colonialism of 500 years ago.” She explained that “in Latin America, we’ve
had dictatorship after dictatorship, extractivism, the United States on top of us and all these
military interventions because of that… free trade agreements where workers are paid under
minimum wage, they have no rights, they count the times they go to the bathroom, just
horrible conditions.” She saw the MGMH as operating from the same logic as these other
policies brought to the Global South by the Global North, saying “it's just a newer
manifestation of that white supremacism, egocentric view of: ‘we know it, this is the
universal truth and we know and this is it and we're going to help you, we're going to bring
you to our level.’” Participant 5 also drew an explicit link between the Global North’s
extraction of resources through slavery, mining, and the ongoing exploitation of labor in her
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country, and the way that MGMH researchers come to “mine data” and pursue donor funding
to support their academic careers:
“There is a power dynamic going on between the South and the North. Sometimes
you'll see how things are done and you wonder if truly the North really seeks the
South's best interest. Sometimes it's a matter of livelihood as well. I can say that
frankly, I have no reservation on that because I am convinced it's how it works,
actually. So, you have scholars, researchers that come to the South to mine data from
the people's distress and they are in their comfort zone in a well-furnished house in
their offices with their own software and well-established systems to analyze the
distress of the people in the South that they have no comprehensive idea about.”
(Participant 5)
Seeing this arrangement and being involved in some of these projects, she began to ask, “is
this meant for keeping up the livelihoods of Western researchers and technocrats, or is it
really meant for me?” Through her experiences in these projects, she came to believe that the
researchers cared about “meeting the donor project outcomes, not really what is truly needed
to make a breakthrough.” She asked: “If everyone was flourishing, as we wish it on paper,
what would become of everyone doing the PhD and masters in global mental health?”
“Well,” she said, “they might become very poor people.”
A recurring criticism was that MGMH experts did not fully understand or account for
local cultures and beliefs in the Global South. Participant 7 was involved with several early
MGMH projects in his country based out of “leading universities” in the Global North. He
came to see that the researchers did not attempt to understand local practices, laws, or
traditions because they “assumed that Western medicine would sort of fix the mental health
problems or distress or trauma going on in Africa.” He explained that the MGMH researchers
would “design the questionnaire, the methodology, and they are based on Canada and
Australia and all that, then bring in a researcher from that country to do the research.” After a
short time, he became “really, really against these design frameworks,” saying that “come on,
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you don’t live here, you don’t understand the legal frameworks, you don’t understand the
politics of social change in this particular country and I find that to be very, very
problematic.”
The participants saw the inclusion of a diverse range of local people with
psychosocial disabilities as having the potential to disrupt this top-down approach in global
mental health. Groups and organizations made up of such people, when included, have
expertise on their own local contexts and treatment experiences in those contexts. As a result,
they are well positioned to aid in adapting or transforming the research to be more responsive
to the nuances of cultural experience and contextual factors. Participants also recognized
local obstacles to the improvement of supports for people with psychosocial disabilities,
including stigmatizing beliefs and corruption in local governments, that needed to be
addressed. However, they spoke of resenting the narrative that because there is stigma and
abuse in their local contexts, a Western model of mental health needed to be imported
wholesale while ignoring the stigma and abuse that occurs within that model.
Resisting Tokenization and Co-Option and Pushing for Full Inclusion
Following the CRPD and the development of regional groups organizing under the
psychosocial disability framework, the participants began to be invited to participate in
global mental health projects. They often found, however, that this participation or
representation was not the same as the “meaningful and authentic engagement’ they were
seeking. Participants detailed a number of practices by MGMH groups that created barriers to
the full inclusion of people with psychosocial disabilities in the process. These ranged from
subtle put-downs to what appeared to be deliberate attempts to “tokenize” and “co-opt” their
contributions.
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Related to the power dynamics discussed above, participants identified feeling lessthan and othered in their interactions with experts in the MGMH. Sometimes this was
reinforced by being reminded to call the researchers by titles, like doctor or professor, but
other times it emerged in subtle interpersonal interactions. Participant 2 described it as “being
in those little interactions with people who try and make you feel as if you are not one
hundred percent a human being when they realize you struggle with mental health
challenges.” Participants also described instances of being intimidated by having to speak in
front of mental health professionals due to their past negative experiences in treatment.
Participant 3, for example, said that the first time she was asked to do a presentation
alongside a psychiatrist, she noticed that she felt as though she should not be there. She
remembered noticing at the time, “even in my own mind, I have this kind of power
imbalance thought, this paternalism thing going on.” Because of this felt pressure to prove
that they understood the work being done, the participants took extra time to read and prepare
for each meeting. Participant 5 explained:
“People sometimes, when participating in a team of experts, researchers, make you
feel, sometimes intentionally, maybe sometimes unintentionally, that you are the one
intruding with less knowledge, that it’s a burden on other team members to take time
to explain you issues, concepts. I don't like that. My mental health condition is not a
barrier to understanding… I don't want people to minimize my expertise and my
abilities only because I was not there from the beginning and… was not familiar with
the language they are using. I don't want people to make me feel that I am a burden to
the team members because I lived the experience... It brings more of a burden on me
because I have to read very thoroughly before the meetings so that I am not left alone
in the discussion, but this is not fair. I'm doing a reasonable accommodation for
myself unduly while the research members should be there to assist me.” (Participant
5)
She went on to explain that sometimes in her role as a psychosocial disability representative
she will need more time because the issues being debated are not just abstract to her, but
deeply personal. She gave the example of working with a committee on psychotic
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experiences, and having the content and debate trigger her own “fresh memory of a psychotic
episode” that involved restraints and needing a week away from the work as a result.
Despite this increased burden and the extra time needed to prepare, more than half of
the participants brought up instances when they were asked to send comments or sign off on
long technical documents on a very short deadline. Several participants independently
referred to these practices–not involving people with psychosocial disabilities until the end of
a process and asking for their support with very little time to review or make changes–as
attempts at “tokenism,” and they understood it to be deliberate. Participant 7 explained: “the
whole structure, in terms of the way global mental health operates, feels more like a structure
of tokenism to give legitimacy to the work without the full and effective participation of
persons with psychosocial disability,” adding, “they’re just getting us into the process to
legitimize whatever they are doing.” Similarly, Participant 3 described being involved in a
project where despite “advocating to be a part of these initiatives right from the start,” she
was “dumped in somewhere along the line” as an “afterthought,” because “oh, now we
realize we need some lived experience involvement.” She added that the short timelines add
to the experience of tokenism because it forces her, if she participates, “to speak on behalf of
all people with lived experience” without being given the time to “engage with other people’s
lived experience and hear their views on this.” She added:
“That really puts you in a bind, because if you refuse to comment, then you don't get
to have an influence at all and you maybe can't take out any of the more harmful
pieces. But if you do participate then it sort of reinforces this pattern where you're not
included until the very end and they use people with psychosocial disabilities to kind
of sign off on it and say, ‘look, we were inclusive.’ So, you're kind of put in a really
difficult situation then.” (Participant 3)
To this point, several participants described having the experience of feeling stuck
when deciding between whether to engage in certain projects or to remove themselves and
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their organizations entirely. Participating risked lending a sort of legitimacy to a project they
did not agree with, by giving the appearance that it included lived-experience perspectives,
but it could also allow them to have some influence on removing the parts they found most
dangerous. On the other hand, if they refused to participate, it could send a message that
these projects need to be more inclusive from the start, but it risked allowing a project to
move forward that would violate human rights standards. Participant 8 echoed the experience
of tokenism saying that “in these institutionalized spaces people with psychosocial
disabilities are seen only as an endorsement. They care about our testimony, not our
participation in any active way that could lead to transformation.” He added, however, that
“the lack of alternatives forces us to take advantage of any space that is open to make change,
to transform.” When Participant 7, and the advocacy organization he worked with, decided to
withdraw from projects that were not operating in compliance with the CRPD (either in their
process or their proposed treatments), he found that the researchers and policymakers in the
MGMH found other lived-experience and mental health advocacy groups to sign off on their
work. “So, the question is then do you leave them to do that, or do you try and create a space
for negotiation?” He explained that he has decided to “engage with all these actors and tell
them, ‘Look, these are the bare minimums in the CRPD. We have to work around the CRPD
being the standard.’” He found this strategy allowed him to have meaningful engagements to
“ensure that the services respect human rights, they respect inherent dignity, they respect
individual autonomy, and they are contributing to the inclusion of persons with psychosocial
disabilities.” He added:
“I might not be able to achieve a hundred percent what I want in terms of full
compliance with the CRPD. But the problem is that when you create a situation
where it's you against us, then at the end of the day, there's much, much, more lose
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because they will find other people who really are not well-grounded in the issue of
human rights.” (Participant 7)
While some MGMH projects switched to different lived-experience groups rather
than reform their goals or processes, others would pick representatives with different
philosophies as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy that took advantage of disagreements
between psychosocial disability advocates to undermine their position. In this way, the
tensions among subgroups within the psychosocial disability umbrella can detract from their
advocacy goals. Participant 7 gave an example, highlighting how divergence on the issue of
legal capacity and forced treatment between advocates can thwart their efforts at reform in
the context of the MGMH:
“For some organizations, forced treatment is okay or and for others, who look at the
CRPD standard, it's not okay. So, you are going before a legislative committee and
you guys are both representatives of organizations of persons with psychosocial
disabilities and yet you have divergent views… then it seems to weaken your position
when the movement is split on these issues, when you're in those larger meetings with
grant makers or global mental health experts… it sort of takes away some of the
power of your argument.” (Participant 7)
While the opportunity to collaborate on new projects with the MGMH risked tokenization,
participants found that allowing professionals to collaborate on new psychosocial
interventions developed by advocates outside of formal systems risked “co-option.” A few
participants spoke of the risks of having alternative healing modalities, outside of the mental
health system, co-opted by professionals. This came up particularly in reference to peer
support groups. For instance, Participant 6 gave the example of a time she invited a
psychologist to participate in a peer support program she had developed, only to find out later
that he had started his own group, turned it back into an expert-patient hierarchy, and was
charging people to attend. She learned from this that when she was “open and trusting of the
good faith of people” and included mental health professionals, “because, I don’t know, I
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thought maybe they know something,” it could result in being “co-opted.” She regarded his
decision to monetize the group as a “travesty,” saying that “especially in a country where
maybe ten percent of people could afford to pay… that’s not a solution... and that’s
dangerous.” One participant described the experience of realizing that even when MGMH
researchers have “good intentions,” they can still fail to “engage people with lived experience
in a meaningful way.” She talked about being on a major workgroup run by leaders of the
MGMH movement and thinking, “they don’t know how to involve me” and “they don’t
know, they have no tools, they have no guidelines” on how to empower “lived experience
involvement in its fullest form.”
Because of their experiences of these power dynamics, tokenization and co-option,
several participants discussed developing guidelines and best practices for the inclusion of
people with psychosocial disabilities, and made several key suggestions. First, they called on
researchers, funders and governments to work collaboratively with psychosocial disability
organizations, who could then select their own representatives to work on the project. By
selecting several advocates with diverse experiences and views relevant to the topic, the
organizations can prevent the project from “cherry-picking” representatives who they believe
will be less challenging to their aims and goals. Once engaged, they recommended that
people with psychosocial disabilities be included in all phases of the research, from the initial
design through implementation and evaluation. In addition, throughout the collaboration
reasonable accommodations should be made that maximize their ability to contribute,
including training in relevant discipline-specific jargon and knowledge, the ability to request
extra time and support, and a recognition of the importance of lived-experience perspectives
to the success of the project.
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Transforming Global Mental Health and Ending Traumatic Practices
Participants were optimistic about the potential for full inclusion of people with
psychosocial disability to transform the MGMH. Participant 5 captured the sentiment put
forward by many of the participants:
“Full participation of people with lived experience will change everything from
intention, from the way of doing it to the service delivery, to policy, to legislation,
community awareness, to insights, everything. Because they are the end users of the
services, call it policy, call it legislation, call it treatment, call it research, call it
intervention modalities. They are the end users with a very personal stake in this. The
more you have a personal stake in anything, the more concerned you are about the
genuine outcome, the effectiveness… because it affects you personally… there is no
stage that, people with lived experience should be left out in the process of research,
projects, monitoring, evaluations, implementation, service delivery, policy legislation,
peer support, advocacy… the more they are involved, the more we are accountable to
them.” (Participant 5)
Notwithstanding the tensions and disagreements explored in the preceding themes,
participants saw the psychosocial disability framework as having the potential to unite lived
experience groups in working together toward certain shared goals. Multiple participants saw
the diversity of experiences and perspectives among these advocates as a strength, as long as
they could collectively resist being broken into competing factions. Participant 6 encouraged
the adoption of the principle of mutual aid, to “work together” instead of acting as
“competition,” adding: “We’re all struggling the same. We’re just being oppressed by many
different aspects of the same structure… let’s help each other out.” For Participant 8, the
psychosocial disability framework was essential to “generate a critical mass of people,” who
are “users of these services” and “know these places from the inside,” elevate “the expertise
of self-experience,” and then “shape health institutions” by “articulating and generating
something different than what has been proposed by the biomedical model.” Participant 5
contested what kind of expertise was most important for improving and implementing global
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mental health, saying that “you need a very, very small amount of technical knowledge to
bring mental health services to the most disadvantaged people anywhere in the world.” For
the more difficult and subtle questions regarding how to make sure people feel supported and
how to get “the understanding of the issues and the context on the ground… you have to have
the story of the lived experience.” She went on:
“The story is there, the experience is there, they know best what is best for them. But
you have to be open-minded and genuinely ready for new recommendations, new
ways of thinking, even if it's costly, even if it means going back to a level zero of the
project… it would change a lot of things if they were really involved at each stage of
any undertaking in mental health.” (Participant 5)
Participant 2 also hoped that listening and learning from the experiences and stories of people
with psychosocial disabilities, “would bring, in the long term, clarity about how some
treatments might seem good in theory but can be traumatic for people.” She hoped that by
hearing about how practices like physical restraints and ECT, in particular, were often
experienced as traumatic, medical professionals might look beyond the “textbooks that say it
works” and question their practices. While some participants expressed doubts over whether
the MGMH was motivated to set aside costs and timelines to listen with an open mind to
their stories and recommendations, they identified ways in which the psychosocial disability
framework could be leveraged politically to make important changes. As Participant 7
observed, “I could have a very nice story of my experiences in the mental health system, but
it has to be grounded on some formal legal policy or framework.” Without legal and
institutional pressure, things would be unlikely to change substantially.
To this point, one reason for optimism highlighted by participants was how the
psychosocial disability framework positions advocates with lived experience to collaborate
with large disability, human rights, and donor organizations to change mental health laws and
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practices. For example, participants detailed collaborations and support from large human
rights institutions such as the United Nations (UN), international disability organizations,
health policy groups, the World Health Organization (WHO), large funding agencies such as
USAID, and several NGOs working on healthcare or human rights globally. Participants
credited the support of these institutions for creating pressure on governments to sign on to
the CRPD and begin in-country reviews of their compliance with these standards. While
many noted that this work with government was slow and difficult, they also celebrated
significant changes to mental health laws that came out of this review process.
Several participants discussed using the CRPD to change mental health laws in their
countries, as part of efforts to end traumatic practices. For example, one participant
mentioned that mental health laws not amended since the colonial era were now being
revisited and revised, and that compliance with the CRPD had played a large role in these
debates. Due to the advocacy efforts of another participant, their local government developed
a plan to “reduce institutionalization step by step” while increasing recovery-based outpatient
care. While she stated that “what we’re really advocating for is tearing it [the asylum] down,”
she expressed excitement about some movement on this issue. Another participant described
new attention to discrimination in the workplace and legislation designed to incentivize
employers to hire and retain people with disabilities (including people with psychosocial
disabilities) by providing reasonable accommodations. She found that companies were
finding ways around this requirement, but the creation of the law nonetheless gave her
organization the ability to advocate in court for people with psychosocial disabilities who
were wrongfully terminated.
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Meanwhile, working in tandem with the larger disability movement, participants have
collaborated with governments and international development partners to open up
conversations about how to ensure that funding for new development projects is compliant
with the CRPD. As these projects often involve large investments and are tied to funding
designed to aid countries in meeting Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), participants
found that governments tend to be “suddenly very responsive to our human rights concerns.”
Several participants discussed the WHO QualityRights initiative, seeing this work as an
important step both for the inclusion of people with psychosocial disabilities in its
production, and for its potential to influence governments, funders and researchers
worldwide. One participant declared that the QualityRights initiative allowed him to go to his
local ministry of health and say, “if the WHO can recognize that the status quo needs to
change and we need to adopt standards as they are laid down in the CRPD, then I think it is
important for us to have critical discussion around the convention.” Similarly, multiple
participants cited the work of the UN Special Rapporteur Danius Puras, acknowledging that
his efforts to promote rights-based mental health had generated new opportunities for their
advocacy.
Acknowledging that “the law cannot address all issues” and that “there are things
which we must address beyond the law,” participants also highlighted new approaches to
research and support services opened up by the psychosocial disability framework. They
described how the framework enabled them to “take a more comprehensive approach” and
begin developing programs that would respond to people in distress or crisis in ways that
respected their human rights. For example, one participant detailed a new initiative where,
“instead of having police as the first line of intervention,” they had a counselor and peer
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support workers meet with the person in distress and their family. Another participant used
the CRPD to advocate for a study investigating “how peer support can contribute to
supported decision making,” thus allowing for the reduced use of forced treatment. Yet
another example by a third participant involved a peer-run “respite place for people that are
experiencing non-ordinary states,” where people might go to recover without having to fear
forced medication or restraints.
Participants also noted the importance of going beyond alternative methods for
responding to acute distress, important as these are, to address “the whole of a person:
psyche, body, soul, mind, environment, everything.” Participant 5, for instance, stated that
“the divide between treatment and social determinants” needed to be challenged. She
explained:
“I think when we say global mental health, global shouldn't only refer to geography.
If you say global mental health, global should also refer to what is global in the
person… For example, if you live in poverty and struggle for having a meal, even if
you give me treatment for my depression, you are not treating maybe the real cause.
So, each time that I am hungry, each time that my family is going through a difficult
time, economically, financially, I go back to my depression. So, there shouldn't be a
divide… between treatment and social determinants. Of course, the social
determinant by itself should be treated also, if we consider global to be truly global.”
(Participant 5)
For this reason, participants advocated for applying the psychosocial disability framework to
stimulate reinvestment in local communities through the recognition of existing resources
and the development of rights-based psychosocial supports. For example, one participant
described a project that targeted social determinants like poverty and substance use in people
with psychosocial disabilities by connecting them with employment and working to increase
their engagement in the community. In line with this thinking, another participant worked to
develop and adapt existing healing methods in local communities, and increase access to
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these supports as an option before sending someone to mental health care. She explained that
in her country, “the family may prefer to resort to some cultural remedies, spiritual remedies,
traditional healing, family treatments, social supports.” Adding resources and ensuring the
protection of rights through these existing supports creates services that are culturally
appropriate in contexts “where spirituality is very influential and explains almost every
action in society,” and has the added benefit of increased investment in the community. If the
distress went “beyond what the cultural and traditional remedies could bring,” she added,
“then people would bring service users to modern psychiatry.” For her, “the bottom line is,
we have to make the best use of what we have on the ground, in the social fabric, so that the
service user is treated and considered in the best way possible.”
Because of the attention to social determinants inherent in the psychosocial disability
framework, participants reflected an overall optimism that their advocacy could lead to
broader social interventions and policy changes benefiting other marginalized and oppressed
groups. Participant 8 argued that people with psychosocial disabilities share a common
struggle with sexual minorities and drug users, as they also “have faced a lot of
discrimination, violence, exclusion,” and are “stigmatized, and most of the times
pathologized, and end up in similar situations like the ones that people with psychosocial
disabilities face.” He argued for an “intersectional perspective, considering discrimination as
a factor that affects a major population in the world,” so that psychosocial disability
advocates could make common cause with other oppressed peoples. “I believe that's the
challenge,” he concluded, “to see these subjects as situations that require broad participation,
social participation, plural participation to really impact the public agenda.”
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the qualitative results in greater depth,
synthesizing the findings in the context of previous research and exploring how the themes
generated contribute to an understanding of the research questions outlined earlier. Table 3
provides a summary connecting the research questions to the results and analysis. An
overarching goal of the present study was to investigate how the conceptualization and
implementation of the psychosocial disability framework can provide a counter-discourse to
the Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH). For this reason, the themes that emerged
from the experiences of the psychosocial disability advocates in this study are discussed in
terms of the possibilities for subjectivity and action that are either created or foreclosed by
the contrasting discourses of psychosocial disability and global mental health.
Conceptualizing Psychosocial Disability
The participants in this study represented diverse perspectives on what psychosocial
disability meant to them and what it was like for them to adopt, at least in certain contexts,
the identity of a person with a psychosocial disability. In this way, the study can contribute to
the process whereby people with lived experience develop theories and models of madness
and distress from a first-person perspective. Indeed, scholars in critical disability studies
affiliated with the European Network of (Ex-)Users and Survivors of Psychiatry have pointed
to the necessity for such self-articulated frameworks in the wake of the CRPD (Russo &
Wooley, 2020). Further, Russo and Wooley (2020) have called for a conceptual model,
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analogous to the social model of disability, to be developed and put forward in order to
prevent the theoretical gap from being filled by the predominant psychiatric discourse when
institutions attempt to implement the CRPD. At the same time, however, others have warned
against replacing “one orthodoxy with another; one monolithic theory with another”
(Beresford, 2015, p. 257). While a formal conceptual model of madness and mental distress
has not yet been fully articulated or accepted to complement the CRPD, advocates (including
the participants in this study) have adopted psychosocial disability as an identity and “lived
into” an evolving conceptualization of this identity to make sense of their own experiences
and work toward change. As Anderson et al. (2015) write:
“After all, activists don’t have to wait around for the ‘right’ or ‘correct’ theory–one
that solves all the challenges they face–before they act to defend or advance their
collective interests. Indeed, some of the most powerful learning takes place in the
process of articulating the struggle against oppression or initiating social change–
when people attempt to make sense of what is happening to them and to formulate a
plan for action.” (p. 289)
As such, the experiences of the participants described in the results capture the concept of
psychosocial disability as it was being used to effect change in different contexts.
As contexts and circumstances varied for participants, they made sense of the
psychosocial disability framework in novel and sometimes contradictory ways, typically
toward pragmatic ends. It is also likely that participants were at different points in their
“journey,” as it was often referred to, with the psychosocial disability identity. They may,
therefore, be at different stages of “conscientization,” or degree of consciousness about their
location in systems of social and political oppression (Beresford, 2019). Add to this the
myriad other differences in cultural context, personal history, type of advocacy, etc., and it
complicates attempts at “monolithic theory.” In this way, the results speak to the advantages
of an overarching umbrella framework that simultaneously reframes the debate about mental
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health in important ways, while leaving room for bottom-up and personal theorizing that
could be adapted to the beliefs and needs of diverse individuals and groups the world over.
Openness to Diverse Meanings of Impairment
The participants spoke to the importance of leaving certain questions open,
particularly those of etiology and impairment, so that individuals would have the freedom to
explore and come to their own narratives and frameworks to make meaning of their
experience. This respect for everyone’s right to work through and make meaning of their
distress is consistent with the ethic of Mad studies scholars who underscore the importance of
creating spaces “where no one individual, school, institution, or local community holds
authority or ownership over its definition and the directions it may take” (LeFrancois et al.,
2016, p. 1). The results also highlight that the personal journey of moving through different
frameworks for understanding distress was essential to participants’ experiences of finding
recovery and community. Participant 6, for instance, connected being “lucky enough to find a
narrative” and “a little bit of a framework” to avoiding being “tied to a bed again” and
“develop[ing] a strong, strong community.”
The results also highlight how participants were conscious of not replicating the topdown power dynamics they experienced in mental health settings, where an explanation was
imposed on their experience. In this way, the psychosocial disability framework exemplifies
the value of epistemic modesty or epistemic humility (Cosgrove & Herrawi, 2021). Epistemic
humility involves acknowledging the inherently partial and incomplete nature of any
explanation, and that allowing a diversity of perspectives to flourish will reveal more about
the phenomena than insisting on a singular or heterodox view (Teo, 2019). In contrast, the
term epistemic violence has been used to describe what happens when individuals and groups
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TABLE 3
Brief Overview of Results and Discussion
Research Questions

Results

Discussion

How did the participants’ lived experience of
mental distress and treatment shape their identity
as people with psychosocial disabilities engaged
in advocacy?

Distress/madness met with biomedical model and
treatment that was experienced as limited and
sometimes harmful.

Encounters with the biomedical model reveal the
epistemic violence of imposing a top-down
reductive interpretation on experiences of mental
distress/madness.

Participants sought recovery through psychosocial
supports and began engaging in mental health
advocacy as a person with lived experience.
The emergence of the CRPD was experienced as
opening up new ways of thinking about their own
identities and presenting opportunities for
advocacy.
Participants began to see psychosocial disability
as an umbrella term for a diverse range of people
with lived experience with different backgrounds
and perspectives.

How does the psychosocial disability framework
shift how advocates make meaning of their
activism in the context of the Movement for
Global Mental Health (MGMH)?

The incorporation of the social model of disability
facilitated an understanding of distress that
connects the individual to their socio-cultural
word, consistent with neuroecosocial approaches.

See themes I.1, I.2, I.3, and II.1 in Table 1

Identifying as a person with a psychosocial
disability led to new understanding of self as
rights-holder that challenged existing scientific,
legal and institutional practices.

The diverse identities and perspectives of
different advocates with psychosocial disabilities
highlighted differences over certain key issues
including impairment and forced treatment.

Tensions between people with psychosocial
disabilities over how (and whether) to engage
with the MGMH reflect different standpoints and
political strategies.

The conception of psychosocial disability adopted
by participants shifted the focus of advocacy
efforts toward promoting rights and addressing
social determinants.

The integration of human rights into the
conception of psychosocial disability was
opposed by powerful psychiatric and
pharmaceutical organizations but is reflected in
recent developments from the UN and WHO.

Participants were afforded greater influence on
mental health research and policy under the
psychosocial disability umbrella.
See themes II.1, II.2, II.3, II.4 and III.1 in Table 1
What are the advantages of using a psychosocial
disability framework when engaging in advocacy
related to the Movement for Global Mental
Health (MGMH) and what barriers do these
advocates face?

Advocates who identified as people with
psychosocial disabilities deliberately avoided topdown frameworks, instead employing epistemic
humility and making room for explanatory
pluralism within the definition of psychosocial
disability.

Participants had increased access to engage with
the MGMH but faced several barriers to full
inclusion.
Participants experienced the power dynamics
involved in engaging with the MGMH as
“tokenizing” and reflective of colonial histories.
The potential to transform the MGMH beyond a
narrow biomedical approach and end traumatic
practices encouraged participants to push for full
inclusion.

See themes III.1, III.2, and III.3 in Table 1
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Support for rights-based mental health can be
leveraged by people with psychosocial disabilities
to push for inclusion in all facets of mental health
research and policy.
The conception of psychosocial disability brings
attention to the interpersonal and contextual
dynamics that can prevent or enable full and
effective participation.
The psychosocial disability framework has the
potential to create a paradigm shift in the MGMH,
drawing attention to the interaction between
mental distress, social determinants, and barriers
to rights.
Psychosocial disability reimagines rights-based
mental health care as one among many supports
including traditional healers, family-focused
recovery, community inclusion, rights protection,
and peer support.

with more power speak about those with less power, reducing their experiences to render
them legible and digestible to those with more power (Spivak, 1988).
While Spivak developed the concept to discuss the dynamics between the Global
North and Global South, the concept has been applied to the phenomenon of doctors and
mental health professionals dismissing the testimony and interpretation of mental health
service-users as unreliable and re-narrativizing their experience in terms of psychiatric
diagnosis (Crichton et al., 2017). In the case of the participants in this study, both
applications of the term apply. Indeed, Participant 8 noted a “certain accord” among
psychosocial disability advocates not to question one another’s choices about the type of
treatment or support they sought out and contrasted this with how, in the mental health
system, certain treatments are presented as “the only option available or imposed on a
person.” Meanwhile, Participant 6 warned that if psychosocial disability advocates “try to
impose our views on each other, we are recreating the problem ourselves of oppressive
power dynamics and hierarchies,” and went on to connect the MGMH to colonialism and
white supremacism.
The epistemic humility displayed by the participants with respect to the issue of
impairment makes room for explanations of madness and mental distress that begin from
different perspectives and prioritize different levels of experience. In this sense, the lack of a
firm consensus on impairment may be a feature, rather than a bug, of the psychosocial
disability framework. Indeed, this may make it compatible with versions of both explanatory
pluralism and standpoint theory. Explanatory pluralism, broadly, refers to the notion that
instead of attempting to reduce experience to either biological, psychological, or social
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explanations, different levels of explanation can be employed pragmatically to answer
different questions (Van Bouwel, 2014). A form of explanatory pluralism was invoked by
Participant 3, when she discussed her reason for leaving room for certain medical
explanations despite her recognition that there are also personal and social causes of
impairment. Standpoint theory, arising out of feminist philosophy, provides a conceptual tool
for examining how people actively construct divergent ways of thinking and knowing based
on their social location, (Ruck et al., 2019). This theory resonates with the repeated
observation by participants that advocates with different philosophies had come to their
views through reflection on their own experiences amidst different social and cultural
circumstances.
One of the risks of uniting diverse groups of people under an umbrella term such as
psychosocial disability is that it can appear to universalize what is a contextually contingent
experience, and conflate varied conceptual positions. For example, Voronka (2016) described
the political risks that emerge when “people with lived experience” is used “as a form of
strategic essentialism to unify our divergent ways of making meaning of our experiences to
enact political gains” (p. 190). For Voronka, strategic essentialism involves taking up a
universal identity and acting as if that identity were a stable entity for the sake of achieving
certain socio-political goals. One risk of strategic essentialism is the way it can obstruct
important socially produced differences in the seemingly homogenous identity of “lived
experience,” i.e. racism, sexism, etc., eclipsing how people with lived experience are
differently positioned. While the participants in this study did actively construct the
psychosocial disability identity as a “political statement” with strategic value, an explicit
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appreciation of explanatory pluralism and standpoint theory concerning different approaches
to impairment can mitigate against the risk of flattening ideological differences.
Humanizing Disability, Diversifying the Human
While the psychosocial disability framework may be open to different
conceptualizations of the etiology of impairment, it is committed to the social model of
disability and the incorporation of people with psychosocial disabilities into the spectrum of
human diversity. All participants put forward a description in line with the social model of
disability; namely, the perceived impairment of the individual (madness/diversity/difference)
is met with a social reaction of oppression and barriers to a full and meaningful life are
created, leading to disability.
Putting aside different conceptualizations of impairment, the participants put forward
an interpretation of the resulting difference as, “part of the nature of human beings… part of
the diversity” (Participant 4). An analogy was drawn to physical disabilities in this regard,
with Participant 2 saying, “the same way that when you wound your arm, you need support
to heal, the same way the mind needs support to heal.” Here, a tension arises between the
framing of impairment as a “natural” phenomenon or as arising out of inequality and social
ills. As noted in the results, this analogy to physical disability alludes to the possibility of
recovery and, indeed, several participants saw their particular forms of
distress/madness/mental disorders as potentially temporary. The possibility of recovery can
be controversial, with some criticizing the biomedical model for being fatalistic and others
criticizing the implication that there is an impairment that needs to change (Morrow, 2013).
The psychosocial disability framework raised an additional issue concerning recovery, as
Participant 1 pointed out when he asked whether the removal of social barriers would mean
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that someone could no longer identify as a person with a psychosocial disability. His
question points to the conceptual and political risks involved in incorporating recovery into
this framework, as it may be used to suggest that once someone “gets better” social supports
and protections can be withdrawn.
This framing of impairment as a normal or natural way of being human, rather than
fundamentally “other” in some way, resonates with a core principle of the neurodiversity
movement; namely, that such conditions “embody human diversity rather than representing
pathology or deficiency” (Beresford, 2015, p. 254). This resonance has also been noted by
Graby (2015) who argues that neurodiversity has the potential “to bridge conceptual gaps
between the disabled people’s and survivor movements–such as the sticking point between
them over the concept of ‘impairment’” (p. 241). Neurodiversity, developed initially by
people who identify as Autistic or with the autism label, is consistent with the social model
and psychosocial disability framework in that it sees disability as arising from social
oppression in response to minority traits. Some proponents have dealt with the issue of
impairment differently, however, viewing it as a difference best explained in terms of
neurobiology and affirming diagnoses like “ADHD” as “real” entities that should be
celebrated and accommodated. While those in this study who continued to identify with a
psychiatric diagnosis spoke about it in similarly biological and universalizing terms, most of
the participants eschewed such diagnostic categories. Meanwhile, recent theorizing on
neurodiversity has developed alternative conceptualizations of impairment that do not reify
diagnostic categories and define function and dysfunction relationally rather than as intrinsic
to the person (see e.g., Chapman, 2021). In this vein, some scholars of psychosocial disability
have proposed an alliance between the Hearing Voices Movement, led by people who hear
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voices and are outside of the mental health system, and the neurodiversity movement (Hart,
2020). The conception of “psychosocial diversity” was also embraced by the Lima
Declaration, discussed earlier, as an umbrella term for people with lived experience
(Redesfera, 2018).
Out of the Biomedical Model and Into the World
Perhaps the most important conceptual shift marked by the psychosocial disability
framework is the move away from narrow biomedical explanations and treatments of
madness and mental distress toward more social approaches. While participants in this study
had different experiences and levels of comfort with psychiatric medications and treatment,
all described the prevailing model in mental health as overtly biomedical and limited. By this
they meant the tendency to view people in distress as deficient and needing to be fixed,
typically through the prescription of medication, with little attention given to the material,
psychological, and relational realities of their lives (see e.g., the “Mental distress meets the
biomedical model” theme). In this description they echo the observations of several
prominent psychiatrists who have decried the field’s myopic focus on neurobiological
research and pharmaceutical treatments. A recent example, in the prominent New England
Journal of Medicine, described “biologic psychiatry” as “plagued by over-prescription of
psychiatric medication” and a “falsely deterministic formulation of mental illness and its
treatment,” leading the authors to call for a “fundamental rethinking of psychiatric
knowledge creation and training” (Gardner & Kleinman, 2019, p. 381). Prominent historians
of the field have recently drawn attention to the failure of such an approach to improve the
lives of service-users, connecting the current paradigm to austerity politics and neoliberalism
in the Global North (Harrington, 2019; Scull, 2021).
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Responses to this call for a fundamental rethinking center around a new paradigm that
would shift the focus away from brain disorders, toward the cultural and social determinants
of global mental health (see e.g., Di Nicola, 2019). The participants in this study saw the
psychosocial disability framework as particularly useful for drawing attention to this need to
take social approaches more seriously. This is consistent with past qualitative studies by and
with service-users in the Global North, who observed that a biomedical model based on
pathology was dominant in their treatment and largely unhelpful, while social approaches
were helpful but underutilized (Beresford et al., 2010). Similarly, Russo and Wooley (2020)
argue that new conceptual models of madness and mental distress developed by those with
firsthand knowledge should include a focus on how societal structures lead to disability.
Acknowledging that biomedical and individualistic conceptions of mental distress inherent in
the psy-disciplines developed out of the politics and worldviews of the Global North, some
have suggested that learning from the Global South is necessary for developing broader
notions of health (Di Nicola, 2020). Accordingly, the present study highlights how
psychosocial disability advocates in the Global South are reimagining madness and mental
distress in a way that disrupts the conceptual divide between the individual and social world.
Breaking Crude Binaries: Mind-Body, Self-World, Science-Rights
The results of this study illustrate how psychosocial disability advocates
conceptualize madness and mental distress in ways that challenge binaries common to the
psy-disciplines. For Participant 5, thinking through the lens of psychosocial disability meant
considering “what is global in the person,” including, “the whole of a person: psyche, body,
soul, mind, environment, everything.” She also noted how this conceptualization challenged
“the divide between treatment and social determinants.” As noted previously, debates about
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approaches to mental health have often broken down into the question of whether to focus on
access to treatment or initiatives to address social determinants. The psychosocial disability
framework, as described by participants, does not fall on one or the other side of this debate.
Instead, participants regularly underscored the centrality of their personal histories, cultures,
and local contexts in shaping experiences of distress and which supports they felt they could
benefit from. Their conceptualizations are consistent with developments in cultural and social
psychiatry to rethink the determinants of global mental health. For Kirmayer (2019), an
“ecosocial approach” considers how our social and cultural worlds “constitute brain and
mind across development and are therefore central to processes of psychopathology and
healing” (p. 31). Similarly, an integrative “neuroecosocial” approach forwarded by medical
sociologists suggests that our social and cultural meaning-making systems shape our physical
environments and influence our neurobiological development (Rose et al., 2021).
A nuanced conceptualization of the reciprocal and multilevel interactions between
social, psychological, and biological processes also breaks down the mind-body split. In the
psy-disciplines, this refers to the tendency to view physiological and psychological processes
as separate; it is particularly evident in discussion of psychosomatic conditions, where
symptoms with a known physical cause are seen to be outside of our control while those with
a supposed psychological origin are viewed as our responsibility (Kirmayer & GómezCarrillo, 2019). Participant 7’s description of his psychosomatic pain symptoms belies this
dichotomy. He came to understand the emergence of his pain as being inextricably related to
the existential shock of his father’s death, the cultural expectations he felt to take on the
“burden and struggle” of leading his family, as well as the material realities of poverty. He
found that being able to talk through his circumstances in relationship to other peers and
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finding supportive employment allowed him to return to meaningful participation in his life
and community. His understanding of his own experience reflects how the psychosocial
disability framework can disrupt the conceptual limits of predominant models and make
room for integrative approaches.
The experiences of the participants also troubled the boundary between objective
science and subjective values through the integration of science and human rights. The
experience of coming to see themselves as rights-holders, for example, shifted their sense of
self and reoriented them toward seeking out supports and advocating for others. In this way,
the psychosocial disability framework makes human rights central to both the methods and
goals of advocates. The idea that public health approaches should be guided by explicit
values rather than “scientific evidence” challenges typical assumptions about the primacy of
objectivity, universalism, and rationalism in the psy-disciplines (Cooper, 2015). These
assumptions are apparent in the experience relayed by Participant 8, in which his attempt to
introduce his former psychiatrist to the CRPD led the psychiatrist to respond that he would
not trust anything without a bibliography. The participant discussed feeling as though this
was a dismissal, suggesting that the psychiatrist was only interested in objective scientific
evidence whether it conformed with subjective values or not.
Psychosocial Disability and the Politics of Mental Health Advocacy
In addition to these binaries mentioned above, the focus on human rights as an
essential component of the psychosocial disability framework challenges the boundary
between treatment and recovery on one hand, and activism and social change on the other.
For participants, this necessitated a shift in their advocacy beyond increasing access to
treatment. At times this generated new tensions, but also new opportunities for alliances. The
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results bring attention to how the larger landscape of mental health advocacy by people with
lived experience was profoundly altered by the emergence of the CRPD and development of
organizations for people with psychosocial disabilities.
The CRPD-Psychiatry Tug of War
Participants, realizing themselves as rights-holders through the CRPD, began to focus
their advocacy on inclusion and social protection for people with psychosocial disabilities.
Participant 7, for example, had previously worked in mental health advocacy organizations
that were supported by doctors and mental health professionals since they mostly worked to
increase access to medication and reduce stigma. However, once he began organizing under
the psychosocial disability umbrella, which positioned him to challenge laws and psychiatric
practices, he encountered opposition from “mental health professionals that were not willing
to adopt the paradigm shift.”
This tension or “tug of war,” with proponents of the CRPD and rights-based
approaches on one side and entrenched psychiatric and pharmaceutical interests on the other,
also played out through public statements and in medical journals. For example,
the Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, featured a point/counterpoint between
researchers who supported the rights-based focus in mental health policy and practice,
including Gill (2018) and Cosgrove and Jureidini (2019), and those who dismissed the
approach as “anti-psychiatry” (see e.g., Dharmawardene & Menkes, 2018). In addition, when
a special issue of the journal World Psychiatry featured several articles calling for the CRPD
to be amended, particularly to preserve forced treatment (see e.g., Applebaum, 2019), six
organizations of people with psychosocial disabilities issued an open letter in response. In the
open letter, the signatories–European Network of (Ex-)Users and Survivors of Psychiatry
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(ENUSP), Absolute Prohibition Campaign, Center for the Human Rights of Users and
Survivors of Psychiatry (CHRUSP), Red Esfera Latinoamericana de la Diversidad
Psicosocial, TCI Asia Pacific, and World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry
(WNUSP)–declared that the paradigm shift underway, due to the social model emerging out
of the CRPD, meant diminishing the social power of psychiatry:
“Based on a social model of disability, the UN CRPD and the CRPD Committee’s
guidance offer us an important prospect to shift away from the biomedical paradigm
when approaching madness and distress and explore not only dignified but also
socially responsible and good-quality responses to human crises. This requires the
relinquishment of power by the psychiatric profession and a re-definition of
psychiatry’s role in society. At times of such a significant historical turn, rather than
admit its many failures and join efforts to collaboratively develop different and better
responses, the WPA has chosen to expand its ‘expertise’ into the field of lawmaking
in order to ‘save the CRPD from itself’” (ENUSP, 2019, p.5).
A year after the open letter, survivor-researchers expanded on their position, arguing that the
CRPD could not be integrated with psychiatry: “In our view, the CRPD came about not as a
demand to change psychiatry but rather as a clear call to change policies, practices, and
mindsets that create psychiatry” (Russo & Wooley, 2020, p. 155). Due to the inherent power
imbalances at play, Russo and Wooley argue that survivor-advocates cannot join alliances or
work toward change with psychiatrists. To their point, the framing of “experts and patients”
inherent in psychiatric discourse can serve to undermine the rights of service-users. An
analysis of the 2007 Mental Health Act in the UK, for instance, found that experts and
doctors were seen as trustworthy while patients were seen as dangerous and non-compliant,
severely limiting their ability to have their testimony heard and believed (Kent et al., 2020).
The results also attest to the different ways that psychosocial disability advocates
experience the power of psychiatry and other mental health professionals, particularly in
terms of the connection between psychiatry and the lobbying power of the pharmaceutical
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industry. Psychosocial disability advocates were at a distinct disadvantage when it came to
influencing governmental policies when they were up against the money, networks, and
influence of psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry. For this reason, researchers have
argued that a robust rights-based approach to mental health necessitates confronting
institutional corruption within psychiatry and the commercialization of psychiatric science by
the pharmaceutical industry (Cosgrove & Shaughnessy, 2020).
This “tug of war” led to participants feeling as if they were “walking a tightrope”
between lived experience advocates and the MGMH. The decision whether to participate in
some of these projects was fraught, as described in the results, with advocates aware of the
risks of not attempting reforms. At the same time, they found that tensions between different
advocates with lived experience could be exploited to maintain the status quo through
tokenization and co-option. Two examples discussed in the results are the tendency to search
for “token” representatives that may be more agreeable on certain issues, or to play advocates
with different positions on key issues off against one another to undermine their authority.
Histories of “consumer activism” in the U.S. reveal similar dynamics, whereby advocacy
groups are compromised by pharmaceutical industry influence and ultimately alter their goals
and priorities (Batt et al., 2020). This history suggests that psychosocial disability advocates
may encounter industry-funded psychosocial disability organizations that have been
manipulated to serve the interests of industry.
New Alliances, Rights-Based Approaches, Political Strategies
Psychosocial disability advocates, due to their connections with both disability justice
and human rights frameworks, received support from powerful international and mainstream
organizations in a way that was unprecedented for lived experience activists. The results
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detail how participants reported collaboration and support with several large organizations,
institutions and funders. including the UN Special Rapporteur Dainius Pūras and the WHO
QualityRights initiative.
Pūras served as UN Special Rapporteur for the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) from 2014-2020, whose mandate is the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
During his tenure, he issued several statements and reports promotinga paradigm shift toward
a rights-based approach to mental health and away from a biomedical model. In line with the
CRPD and the psychosocial disability framework, Pūras called on states, academic
institutions, and other stakeholders to develop frameworks for the meaningful inclusion and
participation of people with lived experience in the design, implementation, delivery and
evaluation of mental health services, systems, and policies (Pūras, 2017). Participants
credited the pressure this placed on governments and other institutions for kickstarting
processes that led to changes to mental health laws and MGMH projects in their own
countries. In his final report, Pūras specifically detailed the need to fundamentally transform
the MGMH away from a reductionistic biomedical approach toward locally adapted and
culturally attuned practices that ensure human rights and prioritize social integration,
connection, participation, and empowerment (Pūras, 2020).
Multiple participants also spoke to the development of the WHO QualityRights
initiative, noting the inclusion of people with psychosocial disabilities in the process as well
as the potential it offered to gain the attention of governments worldwide. In June 2021, the
WHO QualityRights initiative released a report on person-centered and rights-based
approaches to mental health that called on governments to make human-rights central to their
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approach to mental health care, and ensure access to psychosocial supports rather than simply
biomedical interventions (WHO, 2021). The report also highlights twenty-two model
programs internationally that provide services in accordance with human rights principles.
Participants considered the WHO guidance a boon to their advocacy efforts, with one
participant stating: “if the WHO can recognize that the status quo needs to change and we
need to adopt standards as they are laid down in the CRPD, then I think it is important for us
to have critical discussion around the convention.”
The advocates interviewed for this study all discussed how the advent of the CRPD
and their own movement into the psychosocial disability arena had led to encountering a
wide range of identities and philosophies among people with lived experience representing a
number of different countries. Scholars of radical mental health politics have also observed
and written on the resurgence of interest and debates surrounding mental health movements
beginning in 2008. Cresswell and Spandler (2016) identify two overlapping yet distinct
tendencies characterizing this uptick in debate in the Global North: the Mad studies tendency
and the Psychopolitics tendency. They go on describe different political strategies reflected
within each tendency. The Mad studies approach is opposed to psychiatric services and looks
to develop voluntary forms of support outside of mental health systems, while the
Psychopolitics approach is concerned with protecting access to social welfare systems and
reforming services. These tensions were also noted by the advocates in this study; likewise,
they differed in their tendency toward one or the other of these political strategies. Participant
6, for instance, argued for developing communal and mutual aid supports outside of the
system, while Participant 1 was concerned with ensuring that people with psychosocial
disabilities could continue to access disability benefits. However, participants also described
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struggling internally with the question how to decide when to engage in reform and when to
engage in protest. Their experiences highlight the moral complexity of these decisions and
how the choice is most often driven by pragmatic considerations within a specific situational
context, rather than strict ideological adherence to a particular philosophy.
Reimagining Global Mental Health Through the Lens of Psychosocial Disability
The experiences of the psychosocial disability advocates in their interactions with the
MGMH brought to the fore contradictions between various approaches as well as barriers to
meaningful engagement. The results also shed light on how global mental health research and
policies might be reimagined if it were to incorporate a psychosocial disability framework,
rather than a mental health framework.
The results of this study suggest that the psychosocial disability framework has the
potential to create a “paradigm shift” in the MGMH. Because the framework draws attention
to the interaction between the individual and social barriers, it facilitates a transition away
from prioritizing access to mental health treatment and toward addressing social determinants
and guaranteeing access to human rights. The evidence for the impact of these determinants
is extensive in the fields of epidemiology and community mental health. Recent research, for
example, finds that food insecurity predicts worse mental health outcomes across the globe
(Jones, 2017), that poverty and income inequality are associated with increased suicide rates
(Steelesmith et al., 2019), and that the accumulation of financial debts predicts the onset of
common mental disorders (Ten Have et al., 2021). Further studies have found that both
psychotherapy and psychiatric medications are often ineffective for people in poverty
(Finegan et al., 2019), and that providing modest stipends can be associated with greater
improvement than mental health treatment (Haushofer et al., 2020). These findings support
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the contention, voiced by one of the participants, that trying to improve other social issues by
treating mental health will be less effective than changing social conditions to improve
mental health.
There are some indications that the MGMH is increasingly attempting to incorporate
social determinants, yet is still lacking a robust conceptual model that could integrate the
social into mental health. The MGMH is not monolithic, as it is composed of an everevolving assemblage of different institutions, universities, researchers, opinion leaders, and
local collaborators. However, observers of the movement have commented on the shifts
within the field in terms of how it formulates an approach to mental health and designs
interventions, noting some movement from a narrow biomedically focused approach toward
more complex conceptualizations (Bemme & Kirmayer, 2020). A recent analysis of the latest
report from the Lancet Commission on Global Mental Health and Sustainable Development
found that the report showed increased attention to social determinants, such as poverty and
income inequality, but continued to conceptualize the effects of these determinants in terms
of the increased presence of “mental disorders” (Cosgrove et al., 2020). As a result, the
interventions offered to address these social determinants often involve working with
individuals to address issues like isolation, poverty, and unemployment, without sufficient
attention to the social and structural conditions that enable community inclusion and
meaningful participation (Cosgrove et al., 2021).
In this vein, the results capture how people with psychosocial disabilities broaden the
discussion and work on larger structural change. Participant 8 discussed work by
psychosocial disability organizations to advocate for universal basic income, for example.
Noting how these broadened goals might surprise those working within a mental health
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framework, he wondered: “maybe a psychiatrist or a person who agrees with the bio-medical
discourse, would say ‘what does universal basic income have to do with mental health?’” In
another example, people with psychosocial disabilities associated with the Global Mental
Health Peer Network (GMHPN) have advocated for the prioritization of universal healthcare
in development (Stewart et al., 2021).
As the participants pointed out, attempting to address social issues through the lens of
mental health risks obscuring the systemic drivers of these issues. Gender-based violence
was discussed as a complex social and cultural issue which, when treated as a mental health
issue, leaves the status quo unchallenged. This criticism is consistent with theories of
psychiatrization–the sociological process of increasingly treating a diverse range of human
problems as amenable to psychiatric interventions–that highlight the risks of obscuring
collective and political responses to structural issues (Beeker et al., 2021). For this reason,
participants underscored the importance of bringing the CRPD into discussions about
economic development. While the integration of global mental health into the UN
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) created opportunities for advocates to enter a
broader range of discussions with governments, the specific framing of global mental health
within the SDGs risked promoting “reductionist, economistic, individualized and
psychologized responses to poverty” (Mills, 2018, p. 866). Some critics have suggested that a
sole focus on increasing access to psychiatric treatment in the Global South may actually
work against the intentions of the SDGs, by increasing the use of medications with heavy
side effect burdens in the absence of consistent medical care and psychological supports
(Lehmann, 2019). In response, people with psychosocial disabilities examined the current
barriers to inclusion in development programs–including discrimination, legal obstacles, the
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lack of representation of people with psychosocial disabilities in Disabled People’s
Organizations (DPOs), economic exclusion, and a lack of quality pervading community
mental health programs internationally (Davar et al., 2016). The advocate-scholars called on
governments and international development organizations to ensure the inclusion of people
with psychosocial disabilities within all development programs and the implementation of
the SDGs, stating: “Now is the time for the development community to work alongside
people with psychosocial disability, to change the pattern of past injustices, and prevent these
being repeated in the future” (Davar et al., 2016, p. 29).
Can Inclusion Address the Power Dynamics of Global Mental Health?
In this study, a recurring criticism from psychosocial disability advocates was that
MGMH experts did not fully understand or account for local cultures and beliefs in the
Global South. For participants, the top-down imposition of beliefs about mental health as
well as the interpersonal and structural power dynamics with the MGMH were reminiscent of
colonialism. Participant 6, for example, explicitly referred to the MGMH as “the grandchild
of the colonialism of 500 years ago” and equated the logic of the movement with white
supremacism. Indeed, scholarship in anthropology, transcultural psychiatry and cross-cultural
psychology have investigated the ways culture frames how we understand ourselves and
make meaning of our worlds, shaping the experience of mental distress in unique and
culturally specific ways (Jarvis & Kirmayer, 2021). When the MGMH imposes culturally
specific understandings of mental distress on communities in the Global South, with their
own evolving, distinct and diverse cultural frames of reference, it can have adverse effects
that ripple throughout the society, including rampant medicalization (see e.g., the rise of
bipolar disorder in Iran; Mianji & Kirmayer, 2020), increased marginalization of oppressed
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groups (see e.g., the pathologization of women’s emotions in India; Davar, 2020), and the
eclipsing of local ways of understanding and responding to distress (Beneduce, 2019).
To move away from psychiatry’s historical connection to maintaining social control
in the interest of colonial powers (Hickling, 2020), scholars have argued that the MGMH
should adopt “a ‘pluralistic view of knowledge’ that recognizes multiple voices and sources
of knowledge and avoids the ‘epistemic injustice’ that occurs when the knowledge of one
group is validated while others are denied legitimacy” (Bemme & Kirmayer, 2020, p. 8).
Given the principles of full and effective inclusion supported by the CRPD, psychosocial
disability advocates may be well positioned to contribute to this pluralistic view of
knowledge, drawing upon their lived experience to bring attention to the nuances of cultural
experience and contextual factors.
Case studies of the work of people with psychosocial disabilities suggest that their
efforts can transform how mental health care is conceptualized in their communities. For
example, the work of Bapu Trust in India has countered the current discourse of the MGMH
through its attention to “local complexity (of the history of a community and its myriad
networks),” which has had shifted local approaches to care toward “respect of indigenous and
local forms of healing,” awareness “of alternative paradigms of care than psychiatry,” and
the “promotion of non-medical and non-technical solutions” (Mills & Davar, 2016, p. 450).
Participants expressed optimism that if steps were taken to empower the full and effective
participation of people with psychosocial disabilities, it could transform the concepts and
priorities of the MGMH. Of course, the act of including people with psychosocial disabilities
does not on its own address these colonial dynamics, as participants noted how the
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intersection of discrimination against people with lived experience with racism rooted in
colonial histories were apparent in the course of their work with the MGMH.
The descriptions by participants of having their knowledge devalued, being seen as
“not one hundred percent a human being,” internalized paternalism, and deliberate
tokenization are consistent with other qualitative studies on people with lived experience
participating in mental health research and policy efforts. A Dutch study on the experiences
of service users engaged in the co-production of mental health research found that the
relational dynamic and hierarchical contexts led service-user researchers to experience
epistemic injustice, or the diminishment of their ways of knowing (Groot et al., 2020).
Similarly, lived experience researchers have written about the systemic challenges and
marginalization they face when participating in research. Reflecting on their own experience,
Roennfeldt and Byrne (2020) recommend practices for creating the conditions under which
meaningful co-production can emerge. This includes: cross-disciplinary partnerships and
evolving means for acknowledging and addressing power imbalances; recognition of livedexperience produced research and scholarship as a body of knowledge with its own history
and practices; and the cultivation of a culture where vulnerable personal experience and
controversial opinions are met with openness and acceptance (Roennfeldt & Byrne, 2020).
While the full and effective inclusion of people with psychosocial disabilities is far
from guaranteed, participants discussed the use of political strategies and alliances that can
place pressure on the MGMH to move toward compliance with the CRPD, as well as the
development of guidance on what is required for inclusive practices.
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A Menu of Culturally Appropriate and Locally Developed Supports
With all of the above in mind, this study offers a glimpse at how global mental health
might be restructured through the psychosocial disability framework. The participants
articulated a vision of a system where people with psychosocial disabilities, including those
in acute distress, would have a “menu” of possible supports that could facilitate a return to
meaningful participation in community life. In this way, the psychosocial disability
framework facilitates a shift away from a “one-size-fits-all approach” to addressing mental
distress yet avoids an abolitionist stance toward psychiatric and medical intervention.
Instead, psychiatric services are positioned as only one option among many that people could
choose from for support. For example, Participant 5 advocated first offering “cultural
remedies, spiritual remedies, traditional healing, family treatments, social supports” before
sending someone to mental health care. A brief discussion of the other proposed supports that
emerged in the interviews follows below. These suggestions are not meant to be prescriptive
or exhaustive, as the structure and content will vary based on local needs and priorities of
advocates. Rather, this summary is meant to illuminate how the psychosocial disability
framework broadens the conception of support while also transforming existing service in
compliance with human rights standards.
Traditional Healers. In accordance with attention to local contexts and cultures, the
participants suggested that the available supports “in a spectrum of alternatives” should
include local community and religious organizations and traditional healers. As mentioned
previously, the MGMH has been associated with the loss of indigenous healing methods.
Participants actively opposed this trend, explaining that local healers have deep knowledge of
community and family life and often can intervene in ways that the mental health system
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cannot. Anthropological research has documented the effectiveness of these methods crossculturally, and identified common therapeutic components (Bantjes et al., 2017; Green &
Colucci, 2020). Indeed, Western psychotherapy is itself a culturally specific healing practice
that shares key features with the indigenous practices (Bedi, 2018). An important
consideration in building traditional healing methods into a system of supports for people
with psychosocial disability is being careful to avoid the medicalization of cultural idioms of
distress (Kidron & Kirmayer, 2019).
The role of traditional healers is complicated by participants’ discussion of the
potential for abuse in these practices. For instance, a participant in Central America shared
the story of a woman who was burned because she was associated with witchcraft, and
participants in Africa discussed instances of chaining and other abuse due to local beliefs.
However, it was acknowledged that similar abuse occurs regularly in institutions and local
psychiatric practices. As Beneduce (2019) argues, reviewing and incorporating human rights
into traditional healing (see e.g., Read, 2019) should also be taken as an opportunity to assess
harmful elements of Western psychiatry, such as “lobotomy, ECT, restraints, unnecessary
use of drugs, and involuntary hospitalization” (Beneduce, 2019, p. 721).
Family-Focused Recovery. In line with a culturally responsive approach, the
participants advocated for programs that recognize the primacy of family and communal life
in many other cultures. Participants noted that families are often central to the care and
support of people with psychosocial disabilities in their communities. The results highlight
examples where the involvement of family is understood to be inextricable from conceptions
of support and recovery, as well as cases where this encroaches upon the person’s agency.
When it came to negotiating the rights of the individual vs. rights of the family to decide
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what is in the best interest, participants called for a balanced perspective. These accounts are
suggestive of the tension between families as essential for relational healing and families as a
source of stress or trauma (see e.g., Waller et al., 2018), and point to a need to develop
practices for communicating explicitly about the preferred role of family in any supports that
are offered.
Community Inclusion. The psychosocial disability framework prioritizes inclusion
as a human right, but participants also discussed involvement in community life as a
necessary support and advocated for “structures that will enable the empowerment and the
full and effective participation and inclusion of persons with psychosocial disabilities on an
equal basis with others.” This is supported by research finding that empowering and
supporting people with disabilities to engage meaningfully in community life can “enhance
general medical, cognitive, and mental health and wellness” (Salzer, 2021, p. 836). In one
example, a program that brought people diagnosed with psychotic disorders into contact with
a volunteer partner and provided them with a financial stipend to engage in social activities
led to experiencing normalcy and achieving belonging, as well as strengthened social
capacities, engagement with culture, and enhanced physical health (Sheridan et al., 2018).
Community inclusion also necessitates attention to the material realities of community
environments that impact wellbeing (Bratman et al., 2019). Such an emphasis within the
psychosocial disability framework led participants to advocate for economic empowerment
programs, education support programs, and departments on youth welfare, among others.
Rights Protections as Intervention. Understanding community inclusion as a human
right also entails protection against discrimination by employers and social institutions. In
this study, advocates worked to challenge unfair terminations at work based on
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discrimination, and achieve reasonable accommodations for people with psychosocial
disabilities in their places of employment. Recent ethnographic work on the implementation
of rights-based employment supports in Ghana found that workplace accommodations were
essential to the employment and social inclusion of those with psychosocial disabilities. In
addition, discrimination and exclusion are common and disability labor laws often ignored,
leaving people to turn to social protection programs to maintain independence (Read et al.,
2020). For this reason, access to rights protections, legal aid, and advocacy are essential
supports.
Peer Support. Multiple participants discussed having benefited from various forms
of peer support group and advocated for the creation and recognition of peer support, both
within and outside of existing mental health systems. While peer support has received
increased attention within recovery-based mental health services (Mutschler et al., 2021),
lived experience advocates warn that the practice is often co-opted, weakening its potential
(Beresford, 2020). Participant 6 described her own experience of having a peer support group
co-opted by a psychologist. Research suggests the importance of clear role definition and
organizational boundaries to protect peer support workers within the system from being
pressured to adopt the norms and practices of their organizational settings (Ibrahim et al.,
2019). Groups led by people with lived experience also offer support outside of formal
mental health settings. Hearing Voices Groups, for example, are run by people who identify
as voice-hearers and aim to empower members to come to their own understanding of their
voice-hearing experience while receiving support (Schaefer et al., 2021). This approach fits
well within a psychosocial disability framework that, as discussed earlier, encourages a
stance consistent with epistemic humility and explanatory pluralism.
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Rights-Based Mental Health. The participants situated mental health care as a
potential support for people with psychosocial disabilities to access when they choose to do
so. Creating alternative supports and addressing social determinants, it was suggested, will
increase options for people with psychosocial disability and make the decision to enter the
mental health system less of a false choice than if there were no alternatives. The rightsbased approach also seeks to transform the experience of people with psychosocial
disabilities once they are within the system. Following the CRPD, service providers have
attempted to develop community mental health care that respects human rights (Keet et al.,
2019). As in the WHO QualityRights guidance discussed earlier, the aim is to fundamentally
alter how mental health services are conceptualized and implemented. The QualityRights
guidance expands upon previous scholarship on the integration of a rights-based approach
into existing treatment modalities, such as Open Dialogue (von Peter et al,, 2019).
While there were differences among psychosocial disability advocates on the issue of
forced treatment, it was accepted that these practices can be traumatic and should be either
abolished, or reduced to the point of only being used in extreme situations. To this end,
rights-based approaches to crisis response are being developed based on key principles such
as participation and empowerment, equality and non-discrimination, quality and diversity of
care, social inclusion, autonomy, and dignity (Stastny et al., 2020). Participants also brought
attention to the issue of police involvement in crisis response leading to violence and abuse, a
concern relevant to mental health response in the Global North (Weine et al., 2020). The
issue of “legal capacity” extends beyond crisis situations, however, and is implicated in
discrimination and injustice against people with psychosocial disabilities throughout society
(Tate, 2019). The participants saw the psychosocial disability framework as well positioned
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to protect the human rights principles outlined in the CRPD by “putting in play this legal
mechanism to fight this discrimination.”
Recommendations
This study brings attention to the potential of the psychosocial disability framework
to disrupt and transform the MGMH. However, it also highlights the barriers that
psychosocial disability advocates in the Global South face in their efforts toward
“meaningful and authentic engagement.” The participants outlined several recommendations
that could be put in place to improve the inclusion of people with psychosocial disabilities in
the MGMH going forward:
1. Empower psychosocial disability organizations to select representatives who will be
able to engage as part of a proposed collaboration. This ensures that diverse
experiences and views relevant to the topic are represented.
2. Include people with psychosocial disabilities in all phases of research, from the initial
design through implementation and evaluation report writing. This also includes
reviews, literature reviews, commissions, and advisory groups; i.e., all processes of
decision-making and strategy,
3. Ensure the provision of reasonable accommodations for people with psychosocial
disabilities that maximizes their ability to contribute (e.g., training in requisite skills
and knowledge, relevant information, extra time, and other supports). This includes
ensuring adequate deadlines for response (i.e., not asking people for input at the last
minute).
4. Explicit discussions should be held regarding how expertise of people with
psychosocial disabilities will be incorporated, and power differences addressed. In
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addition, collaborators should remain open to a transformation of the project based on
this expertise.
These recommendations are consistent with the declarations from organizations of people
with psychosocial disabilities that have drawn attention to the barriers to full inclusion (TCI
Asia-Pacific, 2018; PANUSP, 2011; Redesfera, 2018). Previous studies on barriers to
engaging people with psychosocial disabilities in the MGMH have also suggested that
collaboration is predictably diminished when advocates are working other jobs to maintain
their financial welfare, indicating the importance of setting aside adequate funding to
compensate collaborators for their engagement (Murphy et al., 2021). However, payment
directly from the project’s leaders can compromise their independence and interfere with
their ability to challenge the status quo. For this reason, a nation’s compliance with the
CRPD necessitates that its government empower and resource representative organizations
serving people with lived experiences of psychosocial disabilities (Eaton et al., 2021).
In sum, the findings of this study speak to the progress people with psychosocial
disabilities have made since the development of the CRPD in developing inroads into
governments and institutions. However, it is important to note that people with psychosocial
disabilities are still widely stigmatized, left out of social programs from which they could
benefit, receiving inadequate supports, subject to traumatic practices and discrimination in
healthcare, and excluded from meaningful opportunities to transform policies that impact
their lives (Kleintjes et al., 2013). In response, people with psychosocial disabilities and lived
experience have identified strategies for further supporting this movement, including: the
recognition that people with various lived experience identities are leaders, researchers, and
experts themselves (Rose et al., 2018); increased solidarity and alliances among different
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groups of people with lived experience, as well as with cross-disability organizations
(Beresford & Russo, 2016); and investment in a pipeline to bring people with psychosocial
disabilities and lived experience into research careers and leadership positions (Jones et al.,
2021).
Strengths and Limitations
This qualitative study was designed to elucidate the experiences of people with
psychosocial disabilities as they navigated their identity, advocacy, and engagement with the
Movement for Global Mental Health. To accomplish this, attention was given to
methodological integrity to maximize the fidelity and utility of the analysis (Levitt et al.,
2021). Fidelity refers to the intimate understanding of a topic that emerges when a researcher
is immersed in the complexity of the issue at hand, has adequate data, reflexively manages
their perspective throughout the study, and grounds their findings in a thorough analysis. The
researcher was immersed in the major topics of study, global mental health and lived
experience mental health advocacy, over the past five years–attending major conferences and
publishing on global mental health, engaging with lived experience activists regularly in his
own advocacy work, and working from a rights-based approach in collaboration with the
UN. Additionally, the researcher spent three years on the development, implementation, and
analysis of this study. Data adequacy was achieved through purposive snowball sampling,
leading to the recruitment of participants who fit the study criteria and had extensive
experience as people with psychosocial disabilities engaging with the MGMH. Groundedness
was accomplished through advanced training in qualitative interviewing and participant
feedback during analysis.
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Another a strength of the study is the extensive experience of the participants.
However, generalizability is also limited by the sample. The participants were all located in
the Global South, where the psychosocial disability framework has received more attention
from advocates. Future research examining the experiences of people with psychosocial
disabilities in other geographical areas could serve to further contextualize these findings.
The missing feedback from two participants on the superordinate themes is another
limitation, as it leaves open the possibility that they did not find resonance with their own
experiences in the summaries presented. The global pandemic that restricted travel over the
past year removed the possibility of engaging with participants and their work in person,
limiting the contact to video interviews. Accordingly, ethnographic and participantobservation research working within the organizations of people with psychosocial
disabilities in their local context is needed.
Summary and Conclusions
The present study investigated how people with lived experience of mental distress
and treatment come to question the mainstream discourses of the psy-disciplines, identify as
people with psychosocial disabilities, and engage in activism both within and against the
MGMH. The IPA study was informed by a critical-qualitative epistemology, and included
eight 60–90 minute interviews with people with lived experience of mental distress and
mental health treatment in the Global South who had organized their advocacy efforts under
the psychosocial disability framework. In addition, all participants had familiarity with the
Movement for Global Mental Health and the majority had extensive experience engaging
directly with major players in the MGMH.
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Through the analysis, three superordinate themes emerged: Journeying Through
Different Frameworks to Psychosocial Disability Identity, Under the Psychosocial Disability
Umbrella: (Re)negotiating Identities, Advocacy Goals, and Tensions, and Walking the
Tightrope During Tug of War: Global Mental Health, Barriers to Inclusion, and
Transformational Potential. The results provide novel insights into how the psychosocial
disability framework, as it is lived by those who have adopted it, contributes to debates on
how to conceptualize madness/distress. The lived experiences of psychosocial disability
advocates, as described in these results, also shed light on how psychosocial disability has
emerged as an umbrella term for mental health activists with lived experience, altering the
landscape of mental health advocacy. Finally, the perspectives of the participants in this
study on their engagement with the MGMH speak to how global mental health research and
policies would be fundamentally transformed toward a rights-based approach by a thorough
integration of the psychosocial disability framework.
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APPENDIX A
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE

Name: __________________________

Age: _____________

Race: ___________________________

Ethnicity: ___________________________

Gender Identity:

❑
❑
❑
❑
❑
❑

Sexual Orientation:

❑ Heterosexual
❑ Gay
❑ Lesbian
❑ Bisexual
❑ Queer
❑ Other:_____________________

Cisgender Woman
Cisgender Man
Transgender Woman
Transgender Man
Gender Nonconforming
Other:__________________

Country of Residence: _____________________________________________________
Country of Birth: _________________________________________________________
Years involved in psychosocial disability advocacy: _____________________________
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1) What has been your experience with formal or institutionalized mental health
services?
a. Possible prompt: Have you sought out or utilized
alternative/traditional/indigenous forms of healing?
2) Has the way that you understood your experience of distress changed over time? If
so, how so?
a. Possible Prompt: Are there any language/frameworks that you found helpful
for making sense of your experience at different times?
b. In what ways, if any, do you find the use of DSM/ICD diagnoses or symptombased language helpful?
c. In what ways, if any, do you find the use of DSM diagnoses or symptombased language unhelpful?
3) How did you first encounter the psychosocial disability framework and how did it
impact you?
4) In your experience, how does the psychosocial disability framework aid you in
making sense of your experiences?
a. Possible Prompt: How has this framework been helpful? What parts of your
experience do not fit this framework?
5) How did you come to get involved with psychosocial disability advocacy?
a. Possible Prompt: What do you see as the primary mission of this advocacy
work?
6) How does your lived experience of madness/mental distress and treatment shape your
involvement in psychosocial disability advocacy?
7) How did you become aware of the Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH)?
8) In what ways has your advocacy work intersected with the MGMH?
a. Possible Prompt: What is an example of a way in which you have engaged
with the MGMH?
9) What has been your experience of the MGMH?
a. Possible Prompt: What do you find helpful about the MGMH? What do you
find unhelpful about the MGMH?
b. In what ways do you see the aims and methods of the MGMH as consistent
with your advocacy? In what ways are the inconsistent?
10) In your experience, have global mental health efforts been inclusive of people with
psychosocial disabilities?
11) What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a psychosocial disability
framework to confront and reform the Movement for Global Mental Health
(MGMH)?
Procedural Integrity Questions:
12) Is there anything else you would like to add, or that we did not discuss?
13) Was there anything that made it difficult to answer questions openly?
14) Do you have any recommendations for future interviews?
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